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Views on the status of scientific models range from blindly trusting – sci-
entific models provide an exact description of the physical world – to dis-
missive – scientific models are no more than mere fictions. How one sees
the ability of scientific models to describe real physical situations is an im-
portant factor in the formulation of a view on scientific models. While the
technological triumphs of the last few centuries have shown that science
can produce excellent practical results, there is no a priori guarantee that
science is not getting the right answers for the wrong reasons, or that sci-
ence is merely getting the numbers almost right. We can gain insight into
just how scientific models can describe real physical situations by under-
standing how scientists go about their business procedurally, as well as the
sorts of reasoning that go into producing a scientific model. Given such an
analysis, the representational legitimacy of scientific models in general, as
well as that of any given scientific model, may be defended or defeated.
In this work I argue for a philosophical model of scientific modelling,
an upshot of which is that models can legitimately represent real physical
systems – not by virtue of the fact that there are those who take models
to perform such a role, but by virtue of the fact that there are certain
principles that, when upheld in the model-building process, ensure the
representational integrity of scientific models. The structure of scientific
modelling rests on these commitments: on the one hand, that models reflect
the way the world is, and on the other, that models adapt to the myriad
applications that scientists put them to. It also makes explicit the kinds of
reasoning that go into producing scientific models, and so can potentially
shed light on phenomena that may seem prima facie paradoxical. I show
that this bears on a particular case of emergence, though the nature of
emergence in general, and just how much the case of emergence that I
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1 Introduction
Despite the numerous practical successes of scientific models, there remain
a surprising number of questions about their status. That scientific models
are useful is not up for debate; models are central to real scientific practice.
Scientists use models in various ways: just as a mathematical model can be
seen as a theory-driven application, empirical or phenomenological models
are also used to develop refinements to existing theoretical models; this
leads, though not in a way that can be uniquely specified, to more general
theories. For example, the empirical formula for the Balmer series of the
spectral lines of hydrogen (which was not based on any prior model, but
involved finding mathematical patterns in measured physical quantities),
and the generalization of the Balmer formula to the Rydberg formula, were
instrumental in the formulation of the Bohr model, which is a much more
general model of the hydrogenic atom.
However, a number of philosophers of science have pointed out the now
well-accepted fact that all scientific models are literally false, or contain
statements that are, strictly speaking, false. This has raised questions as to
how scientific models themselves, as well as the literal falsehoods contained
therein, should be regarded.
A position that does not seem to have appeared in the literature, for
the plain reason of its implausibility, is that we should abandon scientific
models entirely just because we know that they are literally false. Scien-
tific models are too useful, too indispensable to scientific practice, to simply
be tossed aside in this way, or otherwise replaced with something else alto-
gether. After all, the burden of providing a literally true replacement would
fall on the shoulders of such would-be radical opponents of scientific models.
Nonetheless, the literal falsehood of scientific models has motivated some
philosophers to treat them with a healthy dose of caution – for example,
by taking a ‘fictionalist’ view of models. Nancy Cartwright is among the
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philosophers to have noted a strong connection between scientific models
and fictions in claiming that a ‘model is a work of fiction. Some properties
ascribed to objects in the model will be genuine properties of the objects
modelled, but others will be merely properties of convenience’.1 Fiction-
alist accounts, though they regard scientific models as fictions, are rarely
dismissive of them; instead, one of the common challenges for a fictionalist
account of scientific models is how to account for the great success of scien-
tific models in spite of their being fictional. To this end, fictionalists have
crafted accounts of how fictions can, contrary to traditional explanatory
schema, explain features of the actual world, even though they represent a
fictional world. Other approaches have focussed not on the status of sci-
entific models as a whole, but on reconciling the literal falsity of scientific
models with our reliance on them. For example, Paul Teller has argued
for the notion that scientific models are nonfictional representations of the
world, though they contain fictions; and that the standard of truth that a
scientific model has to meet is one of being ‘true enough’ for the purposes
at hand, rather than being exactly true, with no room for error.2
The second sort of enterprise inevitably bears on the first. That is, how
scientific models may be reconciled with current scientific practice bears
on the status of scientific models themselves. Most agree that scientific
models involve some sort of representation, but a lot depends on how we
cash out these terms. We have to seek answers, or at least start with
working positions on, a number of questions. What counts as a scientific
model? Are there different kinds of scientific model? What do scientific
models represent? How do scientific models represent whatever it is that
1Nancy Cartwright, How the laws of physics lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1983), pp.
158–159. Cartwright later also notes a connection between models and fables, in which
she takes models to instantiate the content of theories in a way similar to that in which
fables instantiate morals. See Nancy Cartwright, ‘Fables and Morals’, in The Dappled
World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999), pp. 35–48.
2Paul Teller, ‘Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science’, Fictions in Science,
ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), pp. 235–247.
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they represent?
In this work, I offer a theoretical framework of scientific modelling. I
take the position that scientific models can and do represent actual physical
systems. Of course, they may be used to represent other things as well:
for example, a science fiction writer may model a fictional world in a way
that is similar to our own, using models that also apply to our own. I will
consider the different kinds of scientific models that scientists actually use,
as well as the functions that scientific models perform. This will fix one end
of the structural account that I will offer, that is, what I mean by scientific
models in this account of scientific modelling.
The central issue that I seek to address in this work is just how scientific
models can represent real physical systems. It is one thing to say that
object A represents object B; it is quite another to spell out just how, in
what respects, and to what ends, we take object A to represent object B.
Is the representation appropriate? Are there rules to follow in constructing
scientific models as representations of physical systems, or can just about
anything be a scientific model of just about any physical situation? I
consider various kinds of reasoning that go into producing scientific models.
I do not intend to provide a strict definition of what counts as a scien-
tific model. Such a definition is elusive, and promises little in the way of
illuminating the path to my goal, that is, the structure of scientific mod-
elling. The difficulty in defining what is meant by ‘scientific models’ is
to be expected from the fact that philosophers disagree on what scientific
models are, and by the fact that there are different kinds of scientific model,
hence the term ‘scientific model’ is itself ambiguous. Nonetheless, we can-
not proceed without an idea of what we are talking about; while we can do
without a definition of scientific models, we do need an idea of what kinds
of scientific model there are, or at least, what scientific models do.
Actual usage by scientists will not help here, as scientists use the term
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in even looser ways than philosophers do. As for philosophers, there is
disagreement about what models actually consist of. According to the
‘received view’, models are linguistic subsets of theories, which are in turn
construed as axiomatic calculi. By contrast, the ‘semantic view’ takes
models to be constitutive of theories, which are in turn identified with
sets of models.3 Scientific theories are therefore identified as collections of
models, and scientific models in turn are taken to represent physical systems
in some way, typically that of isomorphism. The semantic view can also
be contrasted with a view which originated with Ronald Giere,4 which has
more recently been adopted by Paul Teller.5 According to the model view,
theories are model-building kits, and models represent by means of ‘some
relevant similarity to what we want to represent.’6. The debate between the
proponents and critics of the semantic view is not something I will engage
with here. I will largely follow the semantic view, which is currently the
dominant position among philosophers.
In §2, I discuss the various functions of scientific models, as well as
some of the reasoning and attitudes surrounding them. I discuss the exem-
plifying function of scientific models, the ubiquitous presence of deliberate
falsification in scientific models, and the central issue to be addressed in
this work – the difficulty associated with using scientific models to repre-
sent actual physical situations. I also show that this difficulty cannot be
overcome through the use of a perfect physical model.
In §3, I discuss the role of an isomorphic abstract model, the matching
model, as an intermediate model between a physical situation and the equa-
tions that we use to represent it, noting the importance of the pragmatic
3Patrick Suppes, ‘A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics
and the Empirical Sciences’, Synthese 12 (1960), pp. 287–301.
4Ronald Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago (1988).
5Paul Teller, ‘Twilight of the Perfect Model Model’, Erkenntnis 55 (2001), pp. 393–
415.
6Paul Teller, ‘Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science’, in Fictions in Science,
ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 238.
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commitments of scientists in any such account of justification. I propose
the use of a further intermediate model, the relevant properties model, can
serve to further clarify the reasoning that goes into producing the equations
that scientists use to describe physical situations. In §3.4, I discuss the role
of the various abstract and physical models, and also incorporate the role
of experiments, in building up a structure of scientific modelling.
Finally, in §4, I discuss emergence for the purpose of showing how the
structure of scientific modelling bears on it. I show that emergent properties
may be located between the matching model and the relevant properties
model in the structure of scientific modelling.
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2 Scientific models
We have seen that there is significant disagreement about the sorts of things
that models might be. This is a significant motivation to avoid the issue of
definition. Rather than attempting a definition of what models are, which
would necessitate taking a stand on the debate surrounding the semantic
view, it is probably best to focus on the characteristics and functions of
models.
A survey of what counts as a model in science will help us to bring into
focus some of the characteristics and functions of models. We have already
seen one of the functions of scientific models: they represent. But other
characteristics and functions of scientific models, such as exemplification,
idealization, and abstraction, are just as important.
In §2.1, I examine the notion of fictionalization, which some philoso-
phers of science have sought to incorporate in their analysis of scientific
models. More specifically, some have thought of scientific models as fic-
tions by, for example, drawing attention to the parallels between scientific
models and the sort of account that one might encounter in a narrative work
of literature. Broadly, this attitude toward scientific models can be called
fictionalism about scientific models; it is an attitude that I will ultimately
reject.
Subsequently, in §2.2, I consider the different kinds of scientific model
that scientists use. I then consider the fact that all scientific models con-
tain, to some extent, idealization and abstraction (§2.3.1) and discuss the
exemplifying function of scientific models (§2.3.3).
2.1 Fictionalization
In this section, I discuss the interesting topic of fictionalization, the view
that scientific models ought to be treated as if, epistemically, they are on a
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par with fictional stories. Fictionalization is deeply connected to our main
concern, which is how models represent reality. It is interesting because the
traditional view of science has it in the business of producing true accounts
of actual systems, while that of fiction has it producing arbitrary accounts
of usually nonexistent situations. While it is undeniable that scientific
models and fictional stories have a number of things in common, I do not
think that it is justified to think of scientific models as fictions.
In the context of scientific models, fictions are idealized constructs such
as lines of flow, point particles, and flat surfaces. The terms ‘fictionaliza-
tion’ and ‘fictionalism’ have their roots in the work of Hans Vaihinger, who
emphasized ‘the use of false or contradictory assumptions’ in modelling,
and had a concern to ‘appreciate the pragmatic virtues that these assump-
tions might bring to scientific reasoning’.7 According to Mauricio Sua´rez,
the general consensus on fictions is that:
The use of fictions is as ubiquitous in scientific narratives and
practice as in any other human endeavour, including literature
and art; and scientists have demonstrated throughout history
a capacity to create, develop, and use fictions for their own
purposes that compares with that of any writers or artists.8
It is easy to see the link between what we normally call a fiction, as
in a ‘fictional story’, and the nonexistent constructs, such as electric field
lines, that count as scientific fictions: the falsehoods that are introduced
in a scientific fiction are introduced intentionally, just as those in a short
story. Of course, works of fiction can be used to communicate important
lessons, often serving as illustrations of moral principles or some other sort
of general truism. This is no surprise, for great works of fiction are informed
by the observations of great writers.
7Mauricio Sua´rez, ‘Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference’, Fictions in Science, ed.
Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 159.
8Ibid.
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So the worry is that perhaps we are not warranted in taking our models
any more seriously than we do our short stories. But surely there are few
who would agree with this view of models. Even though we recognize that
scientific models, like stories, contain intentional falsehoods, the attitudes
involved in introducing those falsehoods to the respective constructs are
very different. The falsehoods that are introduced when a model is con-
structed are introduced in order to illuminate some real situation, hence
not just any falsehood would do. Note that I am not taking as ‘given’ that
models represent real situations unproblematically, only that they are in-
tended to serve this purpose, and the situation that the modeller intends to
model has a bearing on which idealizations are utilized in the model. Let
us extend this line of thought: in a fictional story, the way the world is does
not influence the details of the fictional elements that are introduced, so we
can distinguish meaningfully between the falsehoods that are introduced
in scientific models from those that are introduced in fictional stories. The
way the world is can rule out certain fictionalizations from being introduced
into a scientific model, but it need not rule out any fictionalizations from
being introduced into a fictional story: as long as the writer wishes it, it is
acceptable to introduce any given fictionalization into his or her fictional
story, but this is not the case for scientific models. The fictionalizations
involved in (or may be involved in) scientific models and fictional stories
therefore differ in this significant way.
But this may be too quick. There is a sense in which the way the world
is does affect what falsehoods are introduced to a fictional story, a sense
in which not just any falsehood will do for a fictional story. It is part
of the way the world is that the writer of a short story has some sort of
story in mind, and the intentional falsehoods that are introduced have to
match this. And while this is undoubtedly an inadequate and incomplete
description of the work that authors do, it shows that more needs to be
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done to warrant an attitude towards scientific models that is different from
prevailing attitudes towards short stories. For example, while stories may
be taken to reveal truths about life and the way people live, and scientific
models reveal truths – we hope – about the world, the way in which they
do so should not be the same. However short stories reveal generalizations
about human experience, they do so in a way that involves the reader to a
greater extent than scientific models do in revealing truths about the the
world.
Still, both short stories and scientific models do not fit any real situation
exactly, and both are unrealizable in the real world. Both fictional stories
and scientific models involve intentional falsehoods. Furthermore, scientists
themselves often refer to fictions in discussing scientific models or features
thereof. It may also be desirable to have a fictionalist understanding of
scientific models, as part of the broader project in philosophy of science
to provide a meta-understanding of scientific practice. These features of
scienfitic models and fictional stories warrant a closer look at the notion
that perhaps we ought to treat scientific models as fictions.
A comparison of scientific models and fictional stories cannot dwell only
on the similarities, however. I will give some reasons why we should not
regard scientific models on the same level as fictional stories.
On the point that both fictional stories and scientific models contain
intentional falsehoods, we should note that while scientific models may
contain fictions, this is insufficient to render them wholly fictional.
We can distinguish meaningfully between stories that are fiction, and
stories that are non-fiction. Take, for example, a true story in which the
names have been changed to protect the innocent (or the guilty). Such
stories often contain a significant amount of embellishment, but consider
one such story that does not contain any embellishment apart from the
changes in the names. Suppose that in the story, somebody says, ‘Tom,
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please go to the store to buy some milk,’ while in actual fact what was
actually said is ‘David, please go to the store to buy some milk.’ The
story contains a fiction, yet the story itself is non-fiction. In reading such
accounts, we readily accept that such a dialogue has not taken place as
literally described in the story, while also accepting that we are reading
about a factual, non-fictional sequence of events.
If parallels are to be drawn between scientific models and some kind
of story, then it should be with the fiction-containing true story, and not
the wholly fictional story that describes a sequence of events that have not
actually occurred.
We can model water as an incompressible and continuous medium, but
this involves a deliberate misrepresentation of the structure of water: in-
stead of molecules that exert forces on one another as they move, water is
described as a single, non-discrete entity that has ‘lines of flow’ that never
cross. Yet there is nothing in flowing water to which one can point and say
‘there, that is a line of flow’. The line of flow is a fiction that forms a part
of the model of water as an incompressible medium. It is a component of
the model that is fictional, but it does not render the overall model of, say,
wave propagation itself a fiction – just as the aforementioned true story is
not rendered fictional just because the actual sequence of events did not ac-
tually involve a person named Tom. The story is, on the whole, non-fiction
because it faithfully represents an actual sequence of events, despite con-
taining a fictional name. Models are likewise regarded as non-fictional as
long as they faithfully reproduce or describe certain features of the world,
even if certain details are literally false. And what about a model that
does not even reproduce or describe faithfully any features of the world,
while containing literally false details? Such an account would probably
be thought of as one of those model candidates that one eliminates in the
process of arriving at a model, rather than regarded as a model in its own
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right.9
That scientists use the term ‘fictional’ to describe parts of their models
is poor grounds for claiming that the models themselves are fictional. All
scientists are doing is using the term to denote something that has no
counterpart in reality, as nothing more than a convenience. But exactly
what scientists mean by the term ‘fictional’ is not even important here.
Whatever scientists mean by it, one thing is clear: scientists certainly do
not intend for their models to be treated as works of fiction. While ‘lines
of force’ may be described as a fiction, or called ‘imaginary’ lines of force,
as they often are, scientists surely do not then think of their fluid dynamic
models as fictional stories about pockets of water.
Both scientific models and fictional stories contain intentional false-
hoods and are unrealizable in the real world. This indicates that the two
sorts of account are ontologically the same. Both works of fiction and sci-
entific models are imaginary constructs, products of human imagination.
But while they share an ontology, works of fiction are not scientific models,
though they may be regarded as models of a sort; and scientific models are
not works of fiction. The temptation to classify scientific models and works
of fiction as the same sort of thing just because both of them are unrealiz-
able may stem from by the notion that a bona-fide work of nonfiction has
to provide the truth and nothing else.10 This is an unreasonable demand –
one who would ascribe to this notion should, to be consistent, also consider
true stories that contain name changes, as well as newspaper articles that
contain inaccuracies, works of fiction. Scientists do not produce models
that fit the world perfectly, and when they discuss models they are not
talking about real systems directly, but rather about constructs that are
9Paul Teller has made a similar point regarding models that contain ‘component
idealizations’. See Paul Teller, ‘Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science’, in
Fictions in Science, ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 240.
10Ronald Giere, ‘Why scientific models should not be regarded as works of fiction’,
Fictions in Science, ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 255.
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similar to real systems.
Another source of temptation is a misguided belief that a fictionalist
understanding of scientific models is desirable: regarding scientific models
as fictions could potentially yield some insight into scientific models, hence
giving us a reason to want to treat scientific models as fictions. But the
representational aims of scientific models are relevant here. Whatever the
perceived benefits of a fictionalist understanding of scientific models, even if
a fictionalist understanding of scientific models were to promise extremely
interesting insights, that would not be an honest motivation to argue for a
fictionalist account of scientific models. The aim in providing meta-theory
of scientific practice is to understand scientific practice better. A fictionalist
account of scientific practice may yield insights into scientific practice in the
same way that a component fiction in a scientific model may yield insights
into the physical properties of a system: in neither case should the fiction
therefore be regarded as true. A fictionalist account of scientific modelling
could itself be a fiction that yields insights about scientific modelling. But
this gives us no reason to believe that it is true.
In this section (§2.1), I have argued that scientific models should not
be regarded as works of fiction. The functions of scientific models, as op-
posed to those of works of fiction, are crucial in establishing the distinction
between the two. The ways in which we understand works of fiction and
scientific models are different, and the ways in which scientific models and
works of fiction are created are also different. Scientists are involved in
the construction, application, and understanding of scientific models. A
proper understanding of scientific models should therefore at least take
scientists’ intentions into account. Although scientific models may contain
fictional elements, they are veridical and represent the world in an accurate
way. And while scientific models, like works of fiction, are unrealizable in
the real world, this merely places scientific models on the same ontological
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footing as works of fiction. Scientific models are not, and should not be
regarded as, works of fictions.
2.2 The different kinds of scientific models
The mention of scientific models usually brings theory-driven models to
mind, and all theory-driven models are mathematical models. But it is
worth noting some things that scientific models need not be restricted to.
Scientific models need not be mathematical, and they need not contain any
well-defined relations between physical relations. In other words, models
may be concrete rather than mathematical, and they may be phenomeno-
logical rather than theory-driven. This bears mentioning because of the
way models usually appear in advanced scientific texts – a way that may
lead some to the hasty view that scientific models are mathematical ob-
jects. I would like to caution against this hasty view. Scientific models
may be concrete or abstract; abstract models may be either qualitative or
mathematical; and mathematical models may be either theory-driven or
phenomenological.
We can understand roughly where the hasty view of scientific models
comes from. In theoretical physics, models almost always happen to be
mathematical, but this is because of the mathematical nature of theoret-
ical physics (that is, the universal use of mathematics in the field, even
compared to other areas of physics), and the difficulty of building other
types of models for the entities studied in so-called fundamental theories.
In formal science teaching in schools, it is usually the highly idealized math-
ematical models that are taught to students. Therefore, most people have
the impression that the behaviour of physical systems are neatly captured
by scientific models are abstract, mathematical, and highly idealized. Even
the curious deliberate falseness of idealization often slips under the radar.
Another impression that some have of scientific models, that is related to
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the impression that most scientific models are mathematical, is the im-
pression that mathematical models are easier to work with than concrete
models are for more complicated tasks.
Both of these impressions are misguided. Scientific models take con-
crete, non-mathematical forms as well. For example, a collection of sus-
pended balls could represent the sun and the planets in the solar system.
A concrete model of the classical atom, built with a collection of balls to
represent the electrons and the nucleus, is another example of a concrete
model. If it could be built, then a concrete model of a quantum mechanical
atom that incorporates quantum mechanical properties would also count
as a scientific model. Of course, this would be difficult, as we have no
materials that exhibit properties such as quantum indeterminacy at a non-
quantum level. But the difficulty is technological, not conceptual : nothing
in the concept of a scientific model precludes the possibility of our building
a concrete model of the quantum mechanical atom.
Furthermore, although the notion that most scientific models are math-
ematical is consistent with the fact that scientific models can and do take
concrete, non-mathematical forms, it is also not true that mathematical
models are somehow more important than physical models. This point is
related to the second impression that I mentioned earlier – the impression
that mathematical models are easier to work with than concrete models.
This is untrue: while there may be instances in which mathematical models
are easier to work with than concrete models, there are also cases in which
the reverse is true.
The ease of working with a model depends on how the model is used
and what the modeller intends to do. A physical ‘plastic ball’ model of
the solar system might initially seem easier to work with than a system of
equations, say Newton’s law of gravitation coupled with his general equa-
tions of motion. Indeed, even someone untrained may be able to make true
20
observations about the solar system by observing the plastic model, for
example, by observing in a scale model that ‘Jupiter is larger than Venus’.
But what about making predictions about the future positions of the plan-
ets? In that case, one might think that we do need to use both Newton’s
laws of motion and Newton’s law of gravitation to make predictions. Even
so, a sufficiently ingenious concrete model could still show, say, the effect
of precession and the orbital positions of celestial objects at an arbitrary
point in time.
It might seem that such a concrete model is useless in discovering new
things about the objects within the solar system and how they interact with
one another, since that knowledge must have been present for the model-
building to have begun. In other words, when scientists are interested in
discovering the physical behaviour of systems, mathematical models are
more useful than physical models. But even this is not true of concrete
models in general.
Concrete models are used in many fields of research where equations
fail to make the task of discovering physical behaviours easier. This can
be due to a number of reasons. The equations that are thought to apply
may be unsolvable, whether this is merely as far as we know, or provably
so. For example, the maker of race cars might test scaled-down versions of
new designs in a wind tunnel, because the Navier–Stokes equations that are
thought to apply are nonlinear and, as far as we know, not always solvable.
That computer simulations that utilize the Navier–Stokes equations may
be used to narrow down the range of viable designs prior to wind tunnel
testing is besides the point. Even if the mathematical model of a physical
system is important, the utility of concrete models must still be recognized.
There are also physical systems for which a theory-driven mathemat-
ical model to describe their behaviour does not yet exist. In such cases,
scientists might attempt to establish a phenomenological model, which I
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take to be a model that expresses the results of observed phenomena using
mathematics, while ignoring their fundamental significance. Phenomeno-
logical models often do not have an associated ‘theory’ to speak of that
encompasses most situations of the kind that the model is investigating.
Although phenomenological models are usually constructed to be consistent
with theoretical considerations, they are not constructed from the point of
view of a fully-formed theory, so it often makes no sense to speak of a
phenomenological theory that is distinct from a phenomenological model
itself. For example, the first phenomenological model that is constructed
for a newly-discovered class of objects has no collective theory.
Demetris Portides argues that ‘in actual science theory-driven models
do not represent physical systems, but highly idealized states of affairs that,
by and large, do not obtain in the world. In order to render such models
representational, scientists supplement them with phenomenological ele-
ments.’11 Phenomenological models are therefore relevant to the structure
of scientific modelling and representation, insofar as the process of model
construction plays a role in how the representation is achieved. But my
present aim is just to introduce phenomenological models as another kind
of scientific model that we cannot simply ignore.
2.3 The characteristics and functions of scientific mod-
els
We have seen in §2.2 that scientific models may be concrete or abstract. Of
the abstract models, some are qualitative, but most are mathematical; and
mathematical models themselves are either theory-driven or phenomeno-
logical. All of these different kinds of models are used to represent target
physical systems; are subject to idealization and abstraction; and exemplify
11Demetris Portides, ‘Seeking Representations of Phenomena: The Case of Phe-
nomenological Models’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
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properties of their target systems.
These different characteristics and functions of scientific models – par-
ticularly idealization and its cousins, as well as exemplification – are what I
will discuss in this section. In §2.3.1 I discuss approximation, idealization,
and abstraction, all of which are important forms of scientific reasoning
that are to do with literal falseness in scientific models. I disambiguate
the concept of representation in §2.3.2, and in defending the exemplifying
properties of models in §2.3.3.
2.3.1 Approximation, idealization, and abstraction
Approximation, idealization, and abstraction are important kinds of sci-
entific reasoning that are often conflated, but are actually conceptually
distinct. Each of these kinds of scientific reasoning involves the deliberate
modification of a description of a physical system. In most cases in which
a deliberate falsification or misdescription is introduced, it is to make the
system easier to work with. I will explain in detail how approximation, ide-
alization, and abstraction apply to scientific models, and then argue that
the ostensible reason for employing idealization and approximation, that
is, practical ease of computation, is not a part of the concepts themselves. I
will then explain how approximation and idealization bear on the apparent
problem of representation in scientific modelling.
Approximation is the deliberate falsification to a mathematical model:
a complicated expression is replaced with one that is easier to work with.
Idealization is, strictly speaking, the deliberate falsification of a model of
a target system by treating the target system as something whose features
are simpler than the those of the actual target system. Abstraction is the
deliberate modification of a model of a target system to leave out features
of the target system that are deemed irrelevant.
Because the differences between approximation, idealization, and ab-
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straction seem small, the terms are often used interchangeably with one
another. For example, it seems normal to say that the following is an ‘ap-
proximation’: to describe an ellipse that has a small eccentricity as a circle.
This often happens in practice when describing, say, planetary orbits. All
the planets in our Solar System other than Mercury have a very low orbital
eccentricity, so in many cases the planets are described as having circular
orbits. The Earth is not perfectly spherical, yet it is often described as
a sphere; and even when the Earth is more accurately described as being
‘oblate’, because the Earth does not have a perfectly smooth surface, it
is only approximately so. At the same time, a model in which the plane-
tary orbits are perfectly spherical, and the Earth is a perfect sphere, can
be called an ‘idealized’ model. This is but one example of how the terms
‘approximation’ and ‘idealization’ are used in overlapping ways.
In contrast to approximation, which involves changing the mathemat-
ical model of a system, idealization usually involves an intentionally false
qualitative description of a system as something that it isn’t. For example,
a steel bar may be described as a ‘perfectly rigid bar’; water may be de-
scribed as ‘continuous media’; atoms may be described as point particles.
According to Teller, ‘one speaks of idealization when leaving out some pa-
rameter, causal feature, or other factor in representing a situation, as when
leaving out the force of friction in characterizing a “frictionless plane” or
leaving out the force of gravity between two objects when the force is very
small compared to an electrostatic force.’12 Idealization is therefore the in-
tentional leaving out of details – if the effect of something is small, it is left
out. A sphere with very small bumps on its surface may be characterized
as a smooth sphere.
An accurate application of the terms as I have explained them here
would take a description of an ellipse that has a small eccentricity as a cir-
12Paul Teller, ‘Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science’, Fictions in Science,
ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 239.
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cle to be an ‘idealization’, because this redescription has no mathematics
involved. However, if we take the equation of an ellipse that has a small
eccentricity and replace it with the equation of a circle, then that would be
called an ‘approximation’. In both cases, we begin with an ellipse and end
up with a circle. In cases where idealization is employed, the mathematical
model of the redescribed system usually corresponds to an approximation of
the mathematical model of the original system. This is why the terms ‘ide-
alization’ and ‘approximation’ are often used interchangeably: if a target
system or its redescription will be given a mathematical form, then every
case of approximation appears to involve treating an object as something
that, strictly speaking, it is not; and every case of idealization appears to
involve the substitution of formulas and expressions. Therefore, the dis-
tinction between how the terms ‘approximation’ and ‘idealization’ are used
is not always observed. Teller calls idealization and approximation ‘open-
ended ideas that get used loosely and in overlapping ways’.13 For the most
part, I will use ‘idealization’ to refer to either idealization or approxima-
tion in instances where either could apply, and will make it explicit if a
distinction needs to be drawn between the two.
The difference between idealization/approximation and abstraction is
more significant than the difference between idealization and approxima-
tion. Idealization, characterized as an intentional leaving out of (mathe-
matical) detail, finds a much better contrast with abstraction, characterized
as the intentional leaving out of irrelevant features. Idealization, be it ide-
alization proper or approximation, is applied to the relevant properties in
the model of a physical system, while abstraction involves the removal of
(at least prima facie) irrelevant properties.
Abstraction is just as ubiquitous as idealization because what scientists
investigate in a model is often but a very small subset of the properties of
13Ibid.
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the real physical system. While a concrete model (such as a scale model)
has the possibility of possessing every physical property of a target system,
an abstract model does not. Margaret Morrison notes that abstraction
is responsible for the fact that abstract laws can never literally describe
a real system’s behaviour, because some features of the real system have
been subtracted in order that we may focus on a smaller set of properties
in isolation.14
Approximation and idealization are often presented as cutting out de-
tails in order to achieve a simpler expression that is mathematically easier
to deal with. While it may be true of most approximations and idealiza-
tions that are used in practice, it is not necessarily so – it is not part of
what it means to be an approximation that greater efficiency is achieved.
Let us consider the use of approximation in evaluating a mathematical ex-
pression such as (1 + 0.05)12. The operation indicated by the expression
is to simplify to 1.0512, and then multiply 1.05 by 1.05, and then multiply
the result again by 1.05 repeatedly, until eleven multiplications have been
carried out. This is a computationally intensive procedure for higher pow-
ers, so an approximation is often used in obtaining a numerical answer. In
particular, the binomial expansion of (1 + x)n is typically used to simply
evaluate expressions of this form. Instead of our having to perform (n− 1)
multiplications to obtain an exact answer, the binomial expansion allows
us to rewrite the original expansion in the following way:
(1 + x)n = 1 + nx+
1
2










(n− 4)(n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)nx5 +O(x6) + · · ·
where ‘O(6) + · · · ’ indicates terms of the sixth and higher powers of x.
14Margaret Morrison, ‘Fictions, Representations, and Reality’, Fictions in Science,
ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 129.
26
The typical reasoning goes like this: because x is ‘small’, the higher order
terms ‘vanish’, leaving behind the terms of lower order. Therefore we can
simply substitute x = 0.05, n = 6 into the expression up to the x5 term
(ignoring the ‘O(6)+· · · ’) to obtain 1.340095625, which is considered ‘close
enough’ to the exact value of 1.056 = 1.340095640625 for most purposes
that further terms may be disregarded. Most applications do not even use
the fifth-order term, settling for lower accuracy and higher speed; using the
second- or third-order term is often considered sufficient.
An interesting feature of using the binomial expansion instead of the
unexpanded expression is that the full binomial expansion is actually more
complicated than the original expression; it is only the truncated expansion
that is simpler. In addition, there are cases in which using the binomial ex-
pansion is less efficient than not doing so. For example, using the binomial
expansion to evaluate (1 + 0.05)2 is less efficient than taking a straight-
forward path to the exact result, since the exact result of 1.1025 can be
obtained by multiplying 1.05 by itself just once, while the binomial ex-
pansion of (1 + 0.05)2 entails more than one multiplication. The binomial
expansion is probably the most efficient way to evaluate (1 + 0.05)10000;
its computational benefit is that regardless of how high the exponent n
is, it can still deliver ‘good enough’ results for most uses while keeping
the computational cost at a relatively manageable level. Therefore, while
approximation often buys ease of computation at the cost of accuracy in
practical applications, judicious use of approximations is also required to
achieve even this. Computational costs aside, no result delivered by an
approximation can ever be better and more accurate than an exact result –
the binomial expansion can deliver the exact result if and only if the entire
series expansion is used, but this is only possible with an infinite number
of terms. Approximation is not intrinsically more efficient than exactness.
Here is how idealization itself bears on the problem of representation for
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scientific models. Consider a world in which the spatial geometry is exactly
Euclidean, and in which the only object that exists is a perfect sphere. Now
take that perfect sphere to be the target physical system. A mathematical
description of the target system involves no idealization. There seems to
be no problem with using the equation of a sphere to represent the target
system, any more than there is with having the equation of a circle, x2+y2 =
r2, represent a perfect circle. There is no problem with representation in the
statement ‘If there is a perfect circle, it can be represented by the equation
of a circle.’ On the other hand, when we actually employ the equation of
a circle, there is a prima facie problem of representation. It is the sort of
problem of representation that is present in the statement ‘Here is a plastic
hula hoop. It is not a perfect circle, but we may deliberately falsely describe
it as such. Therefore, it may be represented by the equation of a circle.’ The
difference between the physical systems in the cases presented by the two
statements is that in the first case, the equation exactly describes the target
system, while in the second case, the equation does not exactly describe
the target system. And of course, idealization is present in the second
case, and not in the first, in a way that is conceptually linked to the very
lack of an exact description. Therefore idealization, or something closely
related to it, is at least partially responsible for the apparent problem of
representation.
I have discussed how approximation, idealization, and abstraction apply
to scientific models, and argued that the ostensible practical ease of com-
putation that is usually associated with these kinds of scientific reasoning
is not a part of the concepts themselves. I have also explained how approx-
imation and idealization bear on the apparent problem of representation in
scientific modelling.
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2.3.2 Representation-of and representation-as
In §2.3.1 we saw that idealization causes problems for representation in sci-
entific modelling; yet we do take our models to represent physical systems.
In this section I disambiguate the concept of representation. In particu-
lar, it is instructive to draw a distinction between two different kinds of
representation: by drawing two different kinds of representation, namely
representation-of and representation-as, into sharper focus, we will see that
there is always some sense of ‘representation’ that can be achieved, even
with a model that does not exactly describe its target system; therefore, the
difficulty of representation in scientific modelling is not merely a difficulty
in achieving representation per se, but in achieving a more complex kind of
representation, namely representation-as. We will see that denotation and
similarity, whether individually or in conjunction, are unable to provide
sufficient grounds for establishing this more complex representation.
The term ‘representation’ is irritatingly imprecise. Pictures
represent their subjects; graphs represent the data; politicians
represent their constituents; representative samples represent
whatever they are samples of.15
We can make the following distinctions between different kinds of rep-
resentation: there are p-representations, which represent by denotation. In
cases where the denotations have a subject, i.e., the denotata exist, then
those representations are representations of p. There is, obviously, some
room to manoeuvre when deciding how to represent something, so we need
another kind of representation, which is a kind of p-representation: a rep-
resentation of something as some other thing. All representations of p are
also p-representations, but the converse is not true.
15Catherine Elgin, ‘Exemplification, Idealization, and Scientific Understanding’, in
Fictions in Science, ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 77.
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Some examples will serve to clarify the relationship between these cat-
egories of representation. Let us suppose that I come across a very inter-
esting feline, one so interesting that I feel compelled to draw a picture of
it. My drawing of the cat is a representation of a cat, and it is also a cat-
representation. It is a representation of a cat because the subject of rep-
resentation is an actual cat; the denotata of the picture exists. Elgin sug-
gests that ‘each class of p-representations constitutes a small genre, a genre
composed of all and only representations with a common ostensible sub-
ject matter’.16 It follows that my cat drawing is also a cat-representation
because its ostensible subject matter is of the genre ‘cat’. The cat drawing
is therefore a representation of p and (automatically) a p-representation,
where p in this case is a cat.
There are also p-representations that are not representations of p. Such
is the case for, say, drawings of unicorns and other mythical creatures, or
diagrams of ideal gases, frictionless pulleys, and point particles. The osten-
sible subjects of denotation do not exist. So while I may draw a unicorn,
or place a dot on a page for a point particle, it would be wrong to say that
my drawing is a representation of a unicorn, or that my dot is a repre-
sentation of a point particle. Yet my drawing is a unicorn-representation,
and my dot is a point-particle–representation. What determines whether a
representation can or cannot be a representation-of is whether the subject
exists.
We may further make a distinction among those representations that do
not denote their subject, and are therefore p-representations without being
representations of p. Some p-representations are made out to be represen-
tations of some p, but they fail to be representations of p because p simply
does not exist, as is the case in, say, lumineferous-ether–representations.
On the other hand, some p-representations fail to denote but are not in
16Ibid., p. 78.
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this way defective, because we know very well that the subject of denota-
tion does not exist. The representation can still be useful, as in the case of
ideal-gas–representations, or point-particle–representations. In the case of
such p-representations, it is precisely because they fail to denote an existing
subject that they can be as effective as they are at aiding our understanding
of certain phenomena. The general features of real gases are most easily
understood by examining ideal-gas–representations.
We know what p-representations are, what representations of p are,
and why it is important to make a distinction between the two. Now let
us examine another kind of representation, representation-as, which is ‘a
more complex mode of representation in which x represents y as z. In such
a representation, symbol x is a z-representation that as such denotes y.’17
Perhaps the cat in my first example is interesting because it is par-
ticularly round, and I think it resembles a dumpling. So I draw the cat,
but instead of drawing a four-legged feline form, I draw something that
looks more like a dumpling than a cat. In other words, I represent the
cat as a dumpling; my drawing is an example of representation of x as z.
Representation-as is important in science, because scientific models are of-
ten representations of x as z: the earth is represented as a rotating sphere;
a rod is represented as an array of beads.
A rod can be represented as a one-dimensional array of atoms, a multi-
dimensional array of atoms, a continuous extended body – we have a con-
siderable amount of freedom in what we represent objects as. In fact, we
have so much freedom in deciding what we want to represent objects as,
and likewise what we might want certain objects to be representations of,
that this a problem: representation-of can be achieved by brute stipula-
tion. We can simply decide to have anything represent anything else. On
the simplistic view that any stipulation goes, that is, if we take denotation
17Ibid., p. 79.
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alone to be sufficient to establish representation-as, the barriers to repre-
sentation are set too low. The challenge is to specify what is required for
representation in a way that allows for the vast range of representations
that we are used to, while not trivializing the process.
Consider then the possibility that the representational relationship be-
tween denoting symbol and denotata requires similarity – in other words,
that representation-as is achieved by denotation plus similarity. The ap-
peal of such a move is the prospect of leaving us only with (prima facie)
reasonable representations – no more declaring a water molecule to be a
representation of the United Nations Security Council, for example. But
any such attempt is doomed to failure. Similarity is neither necessary nor
sufficient for representation. ‘Representation is an asymmetrical relation;
similarity is symmetrical. Representation is irreflexive; similarity is reflex-
ive.’18 However, I do not think that this particular objection is telling
against the link between representation-as and similarity; nor does it need
to be. We can establish some relationship between representation-as and
similarity without claiming that representation-as and similarity have the
same structure, so it need not matter that one relation is asymmetrical and
irreflexive, while the other is symmetrical and reflexive.
Here is the real problem with taking representation-as to be established
by denotation plus similarity. As we have seen, representation can be
achieved by stipulation; for any two objects a and b, we can simply de-
clare that a represents b. Denotation can be established between any two
objects, and this is why it cannot be sufficient to establish representation-
as. Likewise, similarity is everywhere in the sense that similarity of some
sort holds between any two objects. Apples and oranges are similar in
some way; my left pinkie and the Eiffel Tower are similar in some way;
no matter how different the two chosen objects, they are still (not neces-
18Ibid.
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sarily physical) objects. So denotation plus similarity does not lead us to
a fulfillment of the prospect mentioned earlier. Unreasonable representa-
tions could still abound; since similarity is pervasive, some similarity can
certainly be found between a water molecule and the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. If similarity is all we need, then there is nothing wrong with
representing the United Nations Security Council as a water molecule.
Elgin’s own example of this sort centres on a tree-picture and the phi-
losophy department:
We might . . . take a tree-picture and stipulate that it denotes
the philosophy department. . . . In one way or another, the
philosophy department is similar to a tree-picture, but it is still
hard to see how that fact, combined with the stipulation that a
tree picture represents the department, could make it the case
that the department is represented as a tree-picture, much less
as a tree.19
Obviously, a meaningful representation can be obtained by an arbitrary
representation of a philosophy department as a tree-picture in a way that I
mentioned earlier: In helping someone visualize the layout of an area. With
a bit of creativity, it is certainly also possible to tell a story in which a water
molecule meaningfully represents the United Nations Security Council. But
what is problematic is not prima facie absurd cases of representation-as that
turn out to have a meaningful story. What is problematic is qualifying such
representations as representation-as simpliciter.
I do not think that our goal should be to block arbitrary representations
in general, but there is obviously something lacking in our characterization
of representation insofar as we are interested in understanding how scien-
tific models represent their target systems – we cannot accept that any
representation will ‘do’. Where scientific modelling is concerned, some rep-
19Ibid.
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resentations are superior to others. The reason why some representations
are better than others has to do with what those particular representations
contribute to the modelling process. This contribution, increased epistemic
access to the features of the target system, is captured by the notion of ex-
emplification, which I will discuss in §2.3.3.
2.3.3 Exemplification
Some representations fail to denote their ostensible subject: for example,
when we use a marble to represent a point particle, or water to represent an
incompressible medium, the subject does not in fact exist. In these cases,
an existing object (the marble or the water) is represented as, and there-
fore denotes, a nonexistent subject (a point particle, or an incompressible
medium). In such representations, the reference runs from the sample to
the label denoting it, rather than from the label to whatever is denoted.20
The value of such representations is to be found in their function of
exemplification. What we gain from such representations is increased epis-
temic access to normally hidden or difficult-to-notice properties of the sys-
tem.21 The denoting symbols that we use to represent existing objects,
even if these symbols are p-representations whose ostensible subjects do
not exist, exemplify certain properties that these objects possess; they are
exemplars of those properties.
Here is an example of exemplification. At a drapery store, small pieces
of cloth often serve as fabric samples for different drapes. The texture
and colour of the drapes are exemplified in the swathes of cloth, so that
potential customers can select their favourite combination of texture and
colour without being sidetracked by the size, style, and shape of the overall
product. Consider, in general, the properties that such fabric samples
20Nelson Goodman, ‘Art and Inquiry’, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 41, 1968, p. 12.
21Catherine Elgin, ‘Exemplification, Idealization, and Scientific Understanding’, in
Fictions in Science, ed. Mauricio Sua´rez, Routledge (2009), p. 80.
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possess. They have a certain mass, length, thickness, and any number of
other properties. But given how they are standardly viewed, most of their
properties are irrelevant. To some extent it is probably useful that they are
under a certain size and weight, for logistical purposes, but even so, they
could well be of a different size and weight; their texture and colour are
their most important properties. In these examples, I consider it secondary
that I talk about exemplification of texture and colour. Exemplification is
selective, and it is possible to exemplify a single property. But it is also
possible to exemplify a small set of properties; the examples can easily be
retold in a way that mentions only one property.
The texture and colour of a fabric sample are its most important proper-
ties because the fabric sample itself exemplifies just the texture and colour
of a set of drapes, and not the other properties. The texture and colour are
therefore the most important property for pragmatic reasons. The purpose
of even having fabric samples is to demonstrate what a certain combination
of texture and colour looks like, and to give an idea of how the drapes might
look. We should distinguish between two ways of viewing the texture and
colour of the fabric samples, and consider, on the one hand, the notion that
the texture and colour of a fabric sample is important because that is what
it was ‘designed’ or ‘intended’ to show; and on the other hand, the showing
or ‘mere’ instantiation of the texture and colour per se. A particular fabric
sample instantiates a chosen combination of texture and colour, and in do-
ing so, it affords the possibility that that texture and colour combination
can be brought to the fore, above any of the other properties that the fabric
sample might have.
Let us consider how the fabric sample achieves exemplification of a tex-
ture and colour combination. It seems that the following are all necessary
ingredients for exemplification: instantiation, reference, and selection. So
a fabric sample exemplifies a texture and colour combination by, first of
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all, instantiating that combination. Reference to the texture and colour
requires interpretation; knowing the function of a fabric sample allows us
to identify its texture and colour as the property to be exemplified. And
the exemplification is selective because the texture and colour combina-
tion of the fabric sample is brought to relative prominence over its other
properties; in fact, the piece of fabric could not possibly exemplify all of its
properties. The selective nature of exemplification implies that nothing can
exemplify all of its properties, though every thing necessarily instantiates
all of its properties. So it is for the fabric sample: it instantiates all of its
properties, and in principle any instantiated property can be exemplified,
but exemplification requires that some property or small set of properties,
not all of them, is highlighted.
Catherine Elgin has made this point with a picturesque example about
falcons:
The tail feathers of a falcon are a distinctive shade of brownish
gray. Nevertheless, a paint company would be ill advised to
recommend that potential customers look at a falcon’s tail in
order to see that color. Falcons are so rare and fly so fast and
display so many more interesting properties than the color of
their tail feathers, that any glimpse we get of the tail is unlikely
to make the color manifest. We could not see it long enough
or well enough and would be unlikely to attend to it carefully
enough to decide whether it was the color we want to paint
the porch. . . . Effective samples and examples are carefully
contrived to bring out particular features. Factors that might
otherwise predominate are omitted, bracketed, or muted.22
While the tail feathers of a falcon possess the property of being a certain
colour, they do not lend themselves well to providing epistemic access to
22Ibid., pp. 81–82.
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that colour, and hence are not a good exemplar for the relevant property.
Nonetheless, we should not think that epistemic access is a function of the
experiment alone. It is one thing to claim that it is easier for people to
focus on property A of an object when properties B, C, and D are ‘blocked
out’. It is quite another to claim that this is the only way people will ever
focus on property A. A person who sees a real falcon flying past might very
well be able to mentally pick out the distinctive brown shade of its tail
feathers.
As we saw in §2.3.2, scientific models provide us with epistemic access to
features of a system, even if the representations are flawed; how this occurs
is through a process of exemplification, which highlights relevant features
despite not providing good access to irrelevant properties. Since exempli-
fication involves highlighting certain – and only certain – properties of an
exemplar, and providing epistemic access to those properties, while making
it easy to ignore ‘irrelevant’ properties, we can expect exemplification to
play an important part in whatever it is that scientific models do. But
even though we might suspect that exemplification and scientific models
have something in common, we have not yet seen an explicit instance of
exemplification contributing directly to a scientific model.
2.3.4 Scientific experiments and exemplification
We know that scientific models can be either mathematical or physical,
that is, abstract or concrete. In §2.3.4 I focus on the role of exempli-
fication in certain concrete scientific models, more specifically, scientific
experiments. We will see that what scientists do in practice, that is, isolate
certain physical quantities in their experiments, is actually an instance of
exemplification at work. Experiments are a good place to look for exem-
plification at work in scientific models because experiments are a kind of
concrete model. Unlike abstract scientific models, concrete models demon-
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strate exemplification much more easily: if one were to draw attention to
specific features of an abstract scientific model, it might be unclear whether
any increased focus on those specific features is a function of the way the
abstract model is set up, or just the way a person focusses his or her atten-
tion. With experiments, it is easier to see that the concrete experimental
model itself makes certain features of a physical situation more prominent,
bringing them to the fore, while diminishing other features.
Experiments are part of a process that involves data collection and data
analysis. These parts are linked because a poorly designed experiment can
result in more difficulty in data collection and data analysis. When design-
ing an experiment, scientists typically try to isolate just one measurable
quantity, that quantity being whatever is of interest to them for the inves-
tigation at hand. Where this is not possible, the experiment yields more
than one degree of freedom, and the more degrees of freedom are present,
the more complicated the data analysis. To be useful, models must be
limited to allowing variation in select aspects of the actual situation; or,
models must represent the actual situation as one in which the degrees of
freedom are reduced. The effect of reducing the degrees of freedom in a
model is to highlight certain properties, and diminish the relevance of those
quantities that are not allowed to vary. When certain features of the sys-
tem are taken to be constant in a model, then the effect of these features
on whatever quantity is being measured can also be assumed to remain the
same for each piece of data. Their relevance to the experiment is therefore
diminished. This can be achieved by actually bringing about that certain
properties are present to the same degree over the course of data collection.
Consider an experiment to determine whether the popping of corn is
affected by the level of humidity in the air. Such an experiment would likely
require the scientist to standardize on the type of popping corn used, heat
the popping chambers to the same temperature, and vary the amount of
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humidity in the popping chamber, to ensure that any differences in popping
success between two batches of corn are not due to differences in the type
of corn used. The susceptibility of popping corn to changes in humidity
is thus exemplified by using a homogeneous type of popping corn for the
experiment. Ideally, it should be the one property that differs between the
two popping chambers.
We have supposed that the experiment described in the previous para-
graph uses a particular type of popping corn – call this type A popping
corn. Now let us suppose that there is found to be no difference in the
rate of popping no matter the relative humidity in the air for type A pop-
ping corn; but for type B popping corn, the rate of popping is adversely
affected by increasing relative humidity; and for type C popping corn, the
rate of popping is positively affected by increasing relative humidity. If the
scientists were to know about this, they might be able to perform further
experiments to determine just what it is about the individual types of pop-
ping corn that cause relative humidity to affect their popping rate in the
respective way. Whatever the scientists subsequently discover about how
popping corn rates are affected by humidity, this much is clear: the result
of the experiment does not show what is true of different types of popping
corn, only of type A popping corn.
The results of the experiment involving type A popping corn simply
cannot be generalized to situations involving type B and type C popping
corn. Even if an experiment for type A popping corn, type B popping
corn, and type C popping corn were to yield the same results, it would be
because the three different types of popping corn just happen to show the
same behaviour, rather than because the behaviour of one type of popping
corn can be generalized to all three.
The popping corn and relative humidity experiment is typical in the
following way: the behaviour that we obtain does not apply across a very
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broad range of situations. Exemplification highlights certain properties
of a system and make those properties more accessible, while diminishing
other properties; experiments, being vehicles of exemplification, manage to
exemplify certain physical properties for particular situations. But there
is a flip-side to this: experiments typically cannot exemplify most of the
properties of a situation other than those that they are designed to exem-
plify. A successful experiment is able to exemplify at least one property of
a system, but certainly not all, and often very few more than it is explicitly
designed to exemplify.
Exemplification is a large part of what makes a scientific model valuable,
yet experiments that display substantial exemplification also seem to suffer
from a difficulty to generalize results from other parts of the experiment to
the physical situation that is being studied through the experiment. There
is no guarantee that an experiment whose scope and design are intentionally
limited will be able to produce results for an arbitrary aspect of the physical
system that is modelled. But is it possible? In §2.4 I explore the possibility
of having a physical model represent any of the physical properties of an
actual situation.
2.4 The perfect physical model account
What allows us to claim that a given scientific model is a model of a given
situation? Representation can be achieved by stipulation, and there is a
sense in which any model can be taken to represent physical situation.
It is desirable to have a criterion which justifies our saying that a given
scientific model is a model of a given situation, and is better as a model of
that situation than of another, or simply is a good model of that situation.
Intuitively, it seems that if a model has exact similarity to a physi-
cal situation, that should qualify it as a model of the situation. But as
there are different types of scientific model, I will first consider the case
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of physical models. When I refer to a ‘physical model’, I mean a concrete
model as opposed to an abstract model, rather than a model that is used in
physics (which would encompass both physical models and abstract mod-
els). Specifically, I consider the notion of a perfect physical model, which
for our purpose here is a model that is exactly similar to the situation
that it is intended to model. I argue that even if such a model is possible,
it is not the sort of model that should be even regarded in the scientific
enterprise as an ideal (as in ‘most desirable’) model.
Consider this line of thinking. Should a perfect physical model exist, its
perfect similarity to a given physical situation justifies its use as a model
of that situation for any given property of the system. If there exists a
perfect physical model, then we can justify the thought that there is a link
between an experiment and an actual physical system. There would be a
link between the perfect physical model and the actual physical system,
because there would be perfect similarity between them. In addition, the
process of modelling by experiment would be just an imperfect copy of the
modelling process employed in establishing a perfect physical model. Real-
world experiments, the type that our scientists actually use, should then
be regarded as imperfect physical models that really aim at replicating as
much of the ‘perfection’ of a perfect physical model as possible.
Let us consider what could constitute a perfect physical model for some
given situation – some quantity of air, for example. Suppose we try to
build a perfect physical model of air. We could try to do this using billiard
balls to represent the air molecules; the random motion of these molecules
could be modelled by putting the balls on a vibrating board so that they
move about in the random way that air molecules do.
This would still not be a perfect model of the situation. For some
purposes it might suffice, but the motion observed with the collection of
balls would not be exactly the same as that of a collection of air molecules.
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So we might specify other properties for the balls – perhaps they bounce
a certain way when they collide, have certain forces of attraction between
each other, and so on. But surely that would not be the end of the story. A
perfect model would account for other properties as well – the temperature
of the system, and perhaps even the disposition for a gas to undergo a
phase change to become a liquid under extreme pressure; and even adding
these properties would not make the model exhaustive.
A perfect model cannot just be able to exemplify some property of
air molecules. It has to be able to exemplify any chosen property of air
molecules. If we can build the physical model such that it can exemplify
any chosen property of air molecules, then we can stop adding properties.
But it seems to me that there is no point at which a further modification
could be made to the physical model to improve it, to bring it closer to
being a perfect physical model. In practice, any physical model that we
build will fall short of being a perfect physical model. But this limitation
is a limitation on our part. It is we who lack the ability to build a perfect
physical model from scratch; to write off a perfect physical model as an
ideal for scientific model builders to pursue – just because we cannot build
one – would be like demeaning the value in an Olympian’s pursuit of ever
faster sprint times just because there is a limit beyond which his speed
cannot be increased.
At least for now, we should pay attention to the thought that perhaps a
perfect physical model can be an ideal, even if it cannot be realized through
our efforts at engineering. I do think that a perfect physical model can be
realized, in a sense.
No amount of engineering will enable us to actually obtain a perfect
physical model, though we may inch closer to it to some degree. But
a consideration of the bare concept of a perfect physical model reveals
the possibility that an actual perfect physical model could obtain through
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stipulation.
Some might say that the only perfect model of a situation is the situa-
tion itself. I deny this statement for two reasons.
The first reason is that a representation is of another object, not of
the representing object itself. For a perfect model to represent an object
would then be at odds with the fact that the model just is the object
itself, and hence cannot represent it. A perfect model therefore needs to
be exactly similar, but not identical to another object. While I deny the
literal statement that the only perfect model of a situation is the situation
itself, I acknowledge that a perfect model will be so very close to the actual
situation that some will be inclined to dismiss the difference between them
and simply consider them to be one and the same thing. But this dismissal
would miss the point: of course a perfect model needs to be exactly similar
to the actual physical situation, for that is the very point of a perfect model.
But at the same time it needs to be non-identical to the situation itself in
order to be a model, and therefore a representation.
The second reason is that I can think of one (though only one) way in
which a perfect physical model of a situation might obtain without it being
the situation itself. In short, I take the actual world to be a perfect physical
model of another possible world for which the corresponding physical parts
of the actual world and the other possible world are exactly similar.
Here is how the actual world, or a part of the actual world, can be fleshed
out in such a way as to satisfy the criteria for being a perfect physical model
of another possible world, or part thereof. Let us take an expansive view
form the Earth outwards – consider the Earth, the Sun, the other planets
in the Solar System, the Milky Way, and every object within the known
extent of the Universe, including those random hydrogen molecules that
might be floating about somewhere in space. We can treat all these things,
all part of the actual world, as a single system, and a physical model for
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another possible world. Before I consider possible objections to this view,
I note here that it does, on the surface, satisfy the criteria for a perfect
model.
Our world clearly possesses exact similarity to some possible world that
is – by specification – physically exactly similar to ours; we clearly have no
reason to choose a world that is not physically exactly similar, and since
we are choosing from an infinite number of possible worlds, there will be
one that is exactly similar to ours. Therefore let us say that there exists
a possible world other than ours for which any physical property in this
other possible world, for which our world is a model, is also present in our
world.
There are a couple of potential objections to my proposed example
of a perfect physical model, and I will discuss these seriously. One, can
another possible world even be selected as a model? There can be no causal
relationship between our world and another possible world; so, we have no
direct acquaintance with other possible worlds – how then can we model
them or represent them by something in the actual world? Two, perhaps
worlds that are exactly similar should be considered identical rather than
distinct, and if the two worlds turn out to be identical, then the perfect
physical model is bankrupt – there is no value in modelling something by
itself.
On the first would-be objection, that is, whether a possible world can
be selected as a model, I wish to note that the isolation of the actual world
from another possible world should in no way prevent us from taking the
actual world to represent the other world. I am not concerned here with
exactly how such representation takes place – we routinely take objects in
the actual world to represent non-existent objects. For example, I can take
a painting that depicts a single-horned horse-like creature to represent a
unicorn.
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A modeller need not have prior acquaintance with whatever is depicted.
Non-Parisians typically learn of the Eiffel Tower through pictures before
they ever set eyes on it in person, and the same can be said about the
pyramids for most people. Not having any prior acquaintance with the
object that is represented should therefore pose little problem. Any notion
that there must be some causal relation for our world to model another
possible world is also false: we readily denote possible worlds as w or w∗,
paying no heed to causal relations – they are simply out of the picture here.
Modelling another possible world, that is, discovering the physical prop-
erties of a part of it by examining the physical properties of a part of the
actual world, is not a problem either, as long as the physical properties
under investigation are similarly present in both the system that is being
modelled and the system used as a model (or, indeed, identical in these
systems – as they are in the case of our modelling part of another possible
world with part of the actual world). For example, in wind-tunnel testing,
how air flows over a real aeroplane wing can be tested using a scaled-down
model of the wing, even though there is no causal process connecting the
air flow over an actual aeroplane wing and the model aeroplane wing that
is used in the wind tunnel.
The opposition mounted by the second objection seems, at first glance,
more serious; it also seems to bring some metaphysical issues into relevance.
The objection goes like this: if two worlds are exactly similar, then the sets
of statements that give complete specification of each world should be the
same. If so, then the worlds are indistinguishable; and if the worlds are
indistinguishable, then by the identity of indiscernibles, the two worlds are
identical.23 If the two worlds are identical, one cannot represent the other,
since a thing cannot represent itself.
It might seem that this objection turns on whether the identity of indis-
23I take, as a basic working statement of the identity of indiscernibles, the principle
that x is identical to y if, for every property F , object x has F iff object y has F .
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cernibles is true. If the identity of indiscernibles is true, then the objection
simply runs as outlined above; if it is false, then even if our world and
an exactly physically similar possible world are indiscernible, they are not
identical, so we can use our world as a representation of the other possible
world. But this does not mean that we have to show that the identity of
indiscernibles is false in order to proceed. It would be a huge undertaking
to have to tackle all possibly relevant metaphysical issues; instead, I will
try to grant as much as I can on the metaphysical front, thereby minimiz-
ing the dependence of my picture of a perfect physical model on a certain
metaphysical conception of the world, and still show that a perfect physical
model is conceptually possible.
Even if I grant the identity of indiscernibles for the sake of argument,
the second objection fails unless two worlds sharing all physical properties
means that they also share all properties. After all, if our world and the
physically exactly similar possible world differ in, say, moral properties,
then it would not matter whether the principle of identity of indiscernibles
holds, since two worlds could share all physical properties but still be dis-
cernible in another way. Thus it might also seem that this objection turns
on whether physicalism is true. 24 If we accept a broad physicalism, then
we have to accept that the two possible worlds in question are exactly simi-
lar not just in physical properties, but also in moral and mental properties,
and hence indiscernible. Every property – not just every physical prop-
erty – possessed by an object in our world is also possessed by the object’s
counterpart in the other world. If both broad physicalism and the identity
of indiscernibles hold, then the objection would seem to stand: our world
cannot be a model for the ‘other’ possible world if the ‘other’ possible world
turns out to be identical to our own world.
24I take broad physicalism to be the idea that all properties that are ostensibly of
other kinds – moral properties, mental properties, and so on – are reducible to, uniquely
determined by, or supervene on, underlying physical properties.
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Of course, if either the identity of indiscernibles or broad physicalism
can be shown to be false, the apparent problem is resolved; but even grant-
ing that both notions are true, our world can still serve as a perfect physical
model of another world. To be more precise, a part of the actual world can
be a perfect physical model of another world.
What we need are, one, a way for a physical system in the actual world
to bear perfect similarity to a physical system in another possible world,
thereby establishing the model as a perfect physical model; and two, a way
to maintain the distinction between the actual world and the other possible
world, so that the model may be a perfect physical model. In §2.4.1 I will
discuss parts of the special theory of relativity, and argue that as long as
individual parts of the actual world are physically isolated from each other
– a claim which is supported by the special theory of relativity – both these
requirements can be met.
2.4.1 The special theory of relativity
Einstein’s theory of special relativity, or simply ‘special relativity’, stands
as one of the best-known and best-verified theories of the 20th century –
though it is by no means the best-understood by a general audience. A
brief treatment of special relativity, along with its most important results,
is needed here to appreciate the example I will present to show that even
if both the principle of identity of indiscernibles and broad physicalism are
true, our world can still serve as a perfect physical model of another world.
Special relativity’s reputation as a revolutionary theory comes from the
unintuitive nature of its postulates, but it is the most complete theory of
macroscopic physics that we have – so much so that ‘its very perfection’ has
been called ‘a barrier to future development.’25 While a full treatment of
the special theory of relativity is fairly complicated, its chief points can be
25Derek F. Lawden, Introduction to Tensor Calculus, Relativity and Cosmology, New
York: Wiley (1982), p. ix
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summarized quickly. One of the postulates of the special theory of relativity
is that the speed of light is the same with respect to any non-accelerating
object: c in all directions.
Another way of arriving at this result is to consider the special theory of
relativity a correction to the term that represents mass in Newton’s Second





where F is the net force acting on an object, m is the mass of the object,
v its velocity, and d/dt is the differential operator for time rate of change.
The product mv of mass m and velocity v is momentum p, so another way
of stating Newton’s Second Law is that the net force on the object is the
time rate of change of the object’s momentum.
Barring situations where mass is accumulated or jettisoned, as with
a snowball that becomes larger as it rolls or a rocket that expels fuel in
order to achieve propulsion, the mass of an object is usually assumed to
be constant. But according the the special theory of relativity, the mass
of an object changes with its motion. The change in mass is not akin to
an otherwise unchanging stone picking up random bits of dirt as it flies
through the air, or a bicycle wheel picking up grime as it rolls through the
street. Rather, the special theory of relativity introduces a change to the
mass of an object as a fundamental relation between an object’s kinetic
energy, which can be deduced from its speed, and its mass, which increases




where m0 is the so-called ‘rest mass’, the mass of a body that is at rest,
v is the speed of the body, and c is the speed of light. According to this
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relation, v increases, so does m; and as v approaches the speed of light, m
approaches infinity. There is therefore no way for any massive particle to
reach the speed of light. Massless particles, such as photons and gravitons,
travel at the speed of light, but not faster; and no massive particles can
ever reach the speed of light. As a result, nothing travels faster than the
speed of light. The effects of gravity, too, are subject to this limitation,
as the so-called ‘mediator’ of the gravitational force is a particle called the
graviton that travels at the speed of light.
If nothing can travel faster than light, then of course no causal process
can travel faster than the speed of light. If I point a flashlight at the sky
and send up a brief pulse of light, that light cannot affect anything out in
space until it reaches that location. This is a straightforward extension of
the fact that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, and can be
stated as a simple corollary: no causal process or transfer of information
can propagate faster than the speed of light. The region of space that could
be affected by my sending a pulse of light up into space is therefore limited.
Specifically, within a time t of my sending out the pulse, I can have a causal
effect on objects within a distance of at most ct of myself, in any direction.
Let the ‘physical model’ of our universe then include all objects within
such a distance of us. Now consider the region containing not just the
objects in our physical model, but also all objects within such a distance
of those objects. Now, anything that happens physically outside of this
region would be distant enough from us to not affect us, and also distant
enough to not affect anything that could affect us. physically. In other
words, at a sufficiently large distance from the physical model in question,
there can be physical differences between our actual world and the possible
world to be represented by ours, and these differences would qualify our
world as distinct from the possible world in question. Ironically, then, we
can approve of the idea that our world can be made a perfect physical
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model of another world by choosing a world that is not literally physically
exactly similar to ours. The world needs to be physically exactly similar to
ours within the region of interest, that is, within a certain distance of the
physical model, while having at least one differing physical event outside of
this region. Therefore, a part of the actual world can be a perfect physical
model for a corresponding part of another possible world.
Suppose my region of interest is this room that I am in in the actual
world w, and that I will be interested in this room for a time t. Suppose,
further, that at the present moment, this room shares all of its physical
properties with its counterpart in another possible world w∗. The region
ct around the room also shares all its physical properties with the corre-
sponding region in w∗. However, let some object in w and its counterpart
in w∗ differ in their physical properties more than a distance ct outside of
this room. Now, within a time t, this room is a perfect physical model of
the room in w∗, as nothing outside of either room can possibly affect them
within time t. On the other hand, the two possible worlds are distinct, since
they contain differences outside of a distance ct from each room; therefore
it cannot be said that all I am saying amounts to is that this room is a
perfect model of itself. In at least this limited sense, the room in w could
function as a perfect experiment for the room in w∗. The two are, after
all, physically identical, so any accurate measurement of or investigation
into the physical properties of objects in the room in w would yield the
same value as the same measurement being performed on the objects in
the room in w∗.
A perfect physical model in this sense is not only possible, it necessarily
exists within the typical framework of possible worlds. Since there is an
infinite number of possible worlds, there must be (at least) one out there
that matches the actual world in the way described above.
In §2.4.1 I have argued, using the ‘machinery’ of special relativity, that
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there is a possible world for which a part of the actual world that we have
epistemic access to can serve as a perfect physical model of a corresponding
part of that possible world; that we can take a part of the actual world to be
physically identical to a part of the possible world in question; and that even
if we grant both the identity of indiscernibles and broad physicalism, we
can still maintain a distinction between the actual world and that possible
world.
Nonetheless, there are some serious limitations to this sort of perfect
physical model. In §2.4.2 I will argue that, despite its apparent promise,
the perfect physical model will not work in a general account of modelling.
2.4.2 Imperfections in the perfect physical model account
In §2.4.1 I defended an account of a perfect physical model against an argu-
ment for its conceptual impossibility. My intention has not been to defend
such an account of a perfect physical model from all arguments against it
taking a central place in an account of modelling. While I maintain that
a perfect physical model is indeed a physical and conceptual possibility,
I do not think that should take a central role in an account of modelling.
Pragmatically, a perfect physical model as I have laid it out can do little sci-
entific work. Furthermore, the perfect similarity that is achieved between
the model and what is modelled obtains in a way that is not only different
from how scientists actually build their models, but is also undesirable as
a target for scientists to emulate. In this section I discuss these issues.
The first issue is that such the perfect physical model can be used to
do no serious scientific work. The actual world w matches w∗ almost by
‘brute’ stipulation – by the fact that there must be some w∗ that matches
our w, and we pick it out by denotation. The perfect similarity of the
rooms in w and w∗ is assured by the fact that they are physically identical
during the time of interest. We have picked out w∗ such that this holds,
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but perversely, this means that we can never have a perfect physical model
of any part of w, the actual world. Strictly speaking, to use the perfect
physical model as an investigative tool means that we are finding out about
w∗, and not about w – although of course whatever has served as a model
in w has identical properties to its counterpart in w∗ as well. Still, if we
are to think of the perfect physical model as having a central role in an
account of modelling, it will not do that it can never take, as a system to
be modelled, any part of the actual world w. Scientists are, almost always,
concerned with a part of w, and almost never (if not never) with a part of
some w∗.
Whatever we know about the room in w∗, we know it only because we
have stipulated that w∗ is a possible world such that the rooms in w and
in w∗ are physically exactly similar. Strictly speaking, the perfect physical
model yields information about a part of another possible world, rather
than about anything in the actual world, so a wind tunnel setup in the
actual world w would be a perfect physical model of the wind tunnel setup
in w∗, and would yield information about something in w∗ rather than
about anything in w – but scientists in the actual world are concerned with
things in the actual world! One might try to salvage the situation by noting
that what the scientists intend to model is just one part of the modelling
process, and one that is in a sense ‘arbitrary’: after all, the scientists could
intend to model another possible world.
It is true that agent-relative beliefs are in a sense up to the agent, but
this does not mean that it makes no difference what the agent-relative
beliefs are. After all, the kind of agent that is involved in the process of
scientific modelling is more often than not a particular kind of agent – the
scientist – that concerns itself with the workings of the actual world, and not
workings of another possible world. The perfect physical model, however,
requires another possible world to do the work, as it were, of allowing
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the perfection in the model to obtain. It is not as if the agent-relative
beliefs and intentions with regard to the modelling are what ensure the
perfection or imperfection of a physical model. So the fact that scientists
never actually intend to model another possible world is significant, and
certainly a strong reason to deny the perfect physical model its would-be
central position in an account of scientific modelling.
The second issue is that there is something wrong with the way the
modelling process takes place – the ‘direction of fit’ is wrong. For example,
in ordinary scientific practice, when building a physical model, the object to
be modelled – a room, in this case – is identified first, and then the model
is built. In the case of the perfect physical model, a scientist must first
identify the room here in w to be the model, before picking out a possible
world to model. If the perfect physical model account strikes the reader as
being disingenuous, this is probably why – while the physical model itself
might be perfect, the modelling process is anything but that.
This reveals something about the modelling process, and I would like
to draw attention to it by way of a parallel with belief. This has to do with
direction of fit. The predominant view about the direction of fit of beliefs
and desires is that beliefs properly should conform to the way the world
is, while desires impose themselves upon the world. It would certainly be
strange if I were to have a belief that there is milk in the fridge, and, upon
opening the fridge only to discover that there is no milk in the fridge, went
out to buy milk in order to make the world conform to my belief. On the
other hand, it would not be strange if I have a desire for there to be milk
in the fridge, and upon discovering that there is no milk in the fridge, go
out to buy milk to put in the fridge in order to satisfy my desire.
To pick this room in w and designate it a perfect model before having
any idea about what to model, and then picking the appropriate world w∗
such that the room in w is a perfect model for the room in w∗ is similar to
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having a belief about whether there is milk in the fridge, and then picking
a fridge such that there is is (or isn’t) milk in the fridge in a way that
makes the belief true. This is vastly unlike how scientists build models.
Nor can we salvage the notion of having a perfect physical model by
trying a different move: choosing to model the room in w, and thereby
arriving first at what is to be modelled, and specifying the room in w∗
as the perfect physical model, for we would have no epistemic access to
the room in w∗. Even if our actual working models are incomplete and
imperfect, at least they do (somehow) provide us with epistemic access to
the systems that they purport to describe.
A perfect physical model is not conceptually impossible, but the mere
fact of its conceptual possibility does not provide a strong reason to use it
as a link between experiments and actual physical situations. Indeed, we
have seen that the process of arriving at a perfect physical model cannot
serve as an example of good science, let alone an ideal worth striving for.
The perfect physical model is a prima facie attractive route, but it looks
as though this particular route is closed to us.
In this section (§2.4.2) I have discussed the issues that remain with using
a perfect physical model, and now we are faced with the following situation.
Scientific practice involves experiments, which are a kind of physical model.
(In this sense I take an ‘experiment’ to be distinct from a ‘simulation’,
though an entire process that is called an ‘experiment’ may involve both a
limited physical model and a simulation.) The line which I have sought to
explore is that if there is a legitimate way, at least in principle, of modelling
an actual situation such that we may arrive at a perfect model, then an
experiment which purports to describe that situation can be linked to the
perfect physical model by way of structural similarity; and the perfect
physical model would in turn be linked to the actual physical model by
way of perfect similarity. However, it turns out that a perfect physical
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model, while conceptually possible, is either not true to the direction of fit
that should be expected of the modelling process, or it fails on account of
our not having adequate epistemic access to the model itself. Hypothetical
scientific practice that uses a perfect physical model to model a part of
another possible world would not seem to be doing good science, or at
least would seem to be going about things in a roundabout way; the perfect
physical model approach, far from being an ‘ideal’ for scientists to pursue, is
rather almost a caricature of scientific pursuit, with scientists in our world
doing science on another possible world, and the science on the actual
world being doing by scientists in some other possible world! Therefore, we
cannot justifiably use a perfect physical model to model an actual situation
and establish a structural similarity between the actual situation and the
experimental model of it.
Having considered and rejected the use of a perfect physical model as a
link between scientific models and physical situations, in §3 I will consider
the use of abstract models for this purpose.
55
3 Abstract models
In this section I examine an attempt to establish a link between a physical
situation and an experiment that tries a different route from what I dis-
cussed earlier. In §2.4 I considered the use of a perfect physical model as a
link between experiment and physical situation in an account of scientific
modelling. In §2.4.2 I discussed why a perfect physical model cannot play
this role satisfactorily, insofar as we desire to build a good scientific model
of a system, because the resulting modelling process would not be true to
scientists’ intentions, and would deviate too far from ubiquitous scientific
practice. I now return to one of my earlier comments, namely that scien-
tific models do not provide us with exact descriptions of reality. Here I will
consider the use of a perfect abstract model.
Two prima facie difficulties spring to mind as to why it might be ill-
advised to use an abstract model, particularly a perfect abstract model,
to establish the link between an experiment and the physical situation to
be modelled. The first reason is that trying to achieve this through the
use of a perfect concrete model has failed, even though both experiments
and physical situations are concrete. This raises the question of how an
abstract model can then bridge the gap between experiment and physical
situation, when we would need to bridge the gaps between the experiment
and abstract model, and also between the abstract model and physical
situation? It seems intuitive that it is easier to link a physical situation
to a physical model via some intermediate physical model, e.g., to link a
physical experiment to an experiment via a perfect physical model, than
to do so via an abstract model.
The second reason is that the abstract models that scientists use in
practice seem to have a problem describing physical situations exactly. The
modelling process involves scientists using an experiment to model a phys-
ical situation, in the process utilizing imperfect abstract models. Account-
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ing for this process using a perfect abstract model therefore requires some
relation between the physical situation and the imperfect model; some re-
lation between the imperfect model and the experiment; and some relation
between the perfect model and all three, in order to explain the relation
between experiment and physical situation. If abstract models do not ex-
actly match any physical situation or experiment, then it seems arbitrary
to claim that a particular abstract model has to do with this and not that
experiment, or with this and not that physical model.
The answer to the first prima facie difficulty is simply to produce an
account of scientific modelling that incorporates abstract models in joining
an experiment to a physical situation. This is, of course, an ongoing aim
of this work. I discuss the second prima facie difficulty in greater detail
in §3.1 – in particular, why our (abstract) models seem unable to provide
exact descriptions of physical situations; and in §3.2, how to get around
this problem.
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3.1 The inexactness of models
In §3, I mentioned two prima facie difficulties with using a perfect abstract
model to provide the link between an experiment and a physical situation
in an account of scientific modelling. The first difficulty, a general worry
about using an abstract model to do the work, will be dealt with in due
time.
In this section, I discuss the second difficulty, which is as follows. The
abstract models that scientists grapple with directly are almost always in-
exact, and the inexactness of the abstract model means that it matches
equally well (or equally poorly) many other experiments and physical sit-
uations. Therefore, for any set of an abstract model, a physical situation,
and an experiment, we need to account for how the abstract model picks
out both the physical situation and the experiment.
One route that is probably unachievable is to fix up the abstract mod-
els that scientists use, so that the abstract models can provide an exact
description of physical situations. This would remove the need to pro-
vide an account for how the model picks out the physical situation, and it
seems ideal to have scientific models that are capable of describing physical
situations exactly anyway.
But such an attempt is misguided, and may well be doomed to failure,
for it is practically impossible for abstract models to give a full description
of a physical situation.26 The notion that given sufficient time, funds,
intelligence, and man-hours, scientists will be able to refine their abstract
models to model physical situations fully and exactly is a long shot at best
for these two considerations: one, there is no guarantee that the world is
such a way that it could be described fully by an abstract model. That is, a
complete description of a physical situation by a small, elegant set of laws
may not even exist, even though we may feel confident that at least certain
26Paul Teller, ‘Twilight of the Perfect Model Model’, Erkenntnis 55 (2001), pp. 393–
394.
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aspects of physical situations can be described fully by abstract models.
Two, even if a set of abstract models that can perfectly describe a physical
situation exists, and even if we were to come into knowledge of this set of
models, we would be unable to apply them in practice, as the actual world
happens to be too complicated and we are creatures of limited intelligence.
The first consideration concerns one of the cherished beliefs of physicists
doing fundamental research: that physics is ‘simple’; that the behaviour
of every physical system can be exactly captured in a finite set of statable
models. But the hope of piecing together a complete picture of the world
in this way may be no more than wishful thinking, for why should physics
be simple? Some may point to the effectiveness of the existing equations,
as seen from the level of accuracy to which scientists are able to predict the
behaviour of certain systems, as proof that physics has given us at least
some reason to believe that the world may turn out to be describable in
simple terms. But it may be that too much has been lost in our mathe-
matical idealizations – perhaps, even though we insist that our models be
simple, the world is just not so.
The main issues at stake here are the complete description of the physi-
cal world by models, as well as reduction between theories. What the nature
of the world possibly not being simple amounts to is that we possibly can-
not combine all true scientific models into a single overarching framework;
faith that we can is unjustified. There is no guarantee that the behaviour
of physical systems is amenable to codification in a small set of abstract
models.
It is unlikely that a physical situation can be completely described by
a finite set of abstract models, but the hope remains that there is some
aspect of the system that can be completely described by abstract models.
The impossibility of describing a situation completely in all respects is
compatible with the possibility of describing just one aspect of the situation
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completely, but the latter logical possibility does not translate into a real
physical possibility either. It is not clear whether discovering additional
abstract models of limited scope will, in theory, allow us to model every
aspect of a physical situation fully.
What is needed to establish a robust connection between a physical
situation and a set of abstract models is for the set of models to be able to
perfectly describe the physical situation. What is needed to justify a belief
that actual abstract models perform the role of describing isolated aspects
of a physical system correctly is a way of connecting the abstract models
to the physical systems.
The second consideration is that even if the ultimate nature of the
world is such that we could possibly manage to completely capture it in
a finite set of abstract models, these models would not help us very much
– even if the laws themselves were correct, we would not be able to apply
them because of the utter complexity of the physical systems. Thus, even
if a physical situation could be linked straightforwardly to a set of abstract
models by means of perfect description, there would still be a gap between
the hypothetical abstract models that do capture the behaviour of the world
perfectly, and the abstract models that we use that do not provide a perfect
description of physical systems.
The second consideration also concerns the idea that given complete
laws of nature, and given a set of initial conditions, we can take the initial
conditions and consider the effect of all the dynamical forces present in the
situation, in order to compute exactly how the system will evolve; this is
the notion of a universe that is not just deterministic, but determinable.
But the complexity of the conditions in the universe is such that we would
not, despite our best efforts, be able to obtain workable ‘initial conditions’
on which to apply a complete set of theories. For example, if we were
to consider an exact law of gravitation, then this point – that the initial
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conditions are too messy – can be seen in the distribution of mass in the
universe. Let us take Newton’s second law, F = ma, and consider a world
w in which this law just is an exact law of the physics of the universe.
Now consider one mole of gas in w, and suppose that a scientist in w
is interested in predicting the exact path taken by a particular molecule
of this gas. Consider how many molecules there are in this quantity of
gas: approximately 6.02 × 1023 molecules per mole. It would be quite
impossible for the scientist to calculate the path of the gas molecule that
he is interested in, taking into account the forces on all the other particles
– there are simply far too many particles to take note of. The actual world
is not even so simple that F = ma can be treated as an exact relation; both
special and general relativistic corrections, dynamic electromagnetic forces,
and perhaps some undiscovered laws need to be taken into account in order
to arrive at a path that is exact, or close to exact. But the point here is
that even if these could all be compacted into an exact relation, it would
still be no solution to the daunting messiness of the initial conditions.
Between the possible lack of simplicity of the world and the messiness
of the initial conditions, we have no choice but to simplify our theories and
models enough so that we are actually able to describe and understand the
world, albeit on our own limited terms. The limitation of our intellectual
capacities is such that even if we grant that the world is such a kind of
thing that can be completely described in a finite set of statable laws, and
that we somehow obtain the full set of initial conditions at an arbitrary
favourable point in time, we would still not be able to apply the laws to
the initial conditions to see how the world evolves. This applies equally
whether we are talking about giving a complete description of the whole
world, or about giving a complete description of just a limited physical
situation.
In this section (§3.1), I have discussed two considerations that are sim-
61
ply matters of fact: one, the world may just happen to be the kind of
thing that cannot be completely described in a way that is both simple
and exact; two, the world simply happens to be the kind of thing whose
precise conditions are beyond our ability to assimilate. As modellers, we
simply happen to be a kind of being that lacks the capacities to work with
the initial conditions and perfect abstract models, even if we knew both
the exact conditions of the physical world and the abstract models that
perfectly describe it.
In §3.2, I discuss a particular kind of perfect abstract model, the match-
ing model, as one step in establishing a connection between a physical
situation and scientific models in general.
3.2 The matching model
Philosophers of science have adopted various positions on how models rep-
resent reality. The received view of theories, which takes scientific theories
to be identifiable with an ‘axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms
are given a partial observation interpretation by mean of correspondence
rules’, has at one time been the dominant position among philosophers of
science.27
The received view has been largely displaced as the dominant position
on theory formulation among philosophers of science by the semantic view,
while Ronald Giere has argued for yet another position, the model view.28
In this section (§3.2) I discuss the semantic view and the model view, which
respond to the inexactness of theories in different ways. I argue that it is
more straightforward, on the semantic view, to establish the connection
between scientific models and physical situations, and introduce a perfect
abstract model, the matching model. However, I do not dismiss the model
27Frederick Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, Ur-
bana: University of Illinois Press (1989), p. 33.
28Ronald Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press (1988).
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view outright, and will give it a second look in §3.3, as it has something to
offer in my overall account of scientific modelling.
The main difference between the semantic view and the model view has
to with whether models represent reality through isomorphism or similarity.
The semantic view takes models to represent physical systems by some
kind of isomorphism – one-to-one structural similarity; the model view
takes models to represent the world through limited similarity, rather than
through isomorphism.29
On the semantic view, models represent reality through some kind of
isomorphism, so it is easy to see how models represent, because isomor-
phism is a well-defined, one-to-one relation between sets. Furthermore, it
is straightforward to see how an abstract model might have an isomorphism
with a particular physical object, but it is not so straightforward to see how
an abstract model might be similar to a particular physical object.
The fact that working scientific models cannot describe real physical sys-
tems exactly leads to the suspicion that in general a model cannot, in fact,
bear an isomorphism to a real physical system, for isomorphism also entails
exactness by virtue of being a well-defined one-to-one relation. Therefore,
although the semantic view makes it easy to see how models represent
– through isomorphism, the isomorphism itself is difficult to justify for
working scientific models, because isomorphism requires exactness, which
working scientific models lack. This failing is clear on a general considera-
tion of the physical situation. It is worth noting that although some have
characterized the relation between models and physical situations as being
one of partial isomorphism, in accordance with which physical theories are
embedded within mathematical structures, this still requires idealization to
have taken place as the background to such embedding.30 Partial isomor-
29Paul Teller, ‘Twilight of the Perfect Model Model’, Erkenntnis 55 (2001), p. 396.
30Steven French, ‘The reasonable effectiveness of mathematics: partial structures and
the application of group theory to physics’, Synthese 125 (2000), pp. 103–120.
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phism is related, as might be expected, to isomorphism, but an account of
partial isomorphism will also need to give an account of what idealizing or
abstracting moves are made.
On the model view, scientific models represent physical situations through
similarity. Similarity is easier to establish than isomorphism is because,
unlike isomorphism, it does not suggest any exactness about the repre-
sentation. But saying that models represent through similarity does not
actually show how models represent. Suppose a detective seeks to uncover
how a murder occurred; it is known that the murder weapon is a water-
melon. How did the murderer kill his victim? With a watermelon. But
how – Bludgeoning? Drowning in watermelon juice? Choking on pieces of
watermelon rind?
The range of things that could count as ‘similarity’ is staggering, which
is why similarity alone is unable to bridge the gap between models and
physical systems. It is unsatisfying to claim that models represent ‘through
similarity’, in the same way that it is unsatisfying to simply say that a
murderer has killed his victim ‘with a watermelon’. It leaves us puzzled
as to how the process that we are interested in, be it representation or
murder, really happens. It seems as though the model view is unable to
provide a picture of just how models come to represent physical situations
through similarity, simply because similarity is ubiquitous and too easily
established between any two objects.
A proponent of the model view would say that this is an unfair charge
to level against the model view. The flipside of having models bear the
relation of similarity, rather than isomorphism, to physical models is that
this makes models far more versatile. Similarity as a link between models
and physical situations is desirable in the sense that it allows scientists to
model a large variety of phsyical situations; it is establishing it as a suitable
link within an account of scientific modelling that is problematic. There
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may be no simple answer for how a model represents in general, if similarity
is to be the link between the model and the physical situation, because each
particular case requires specific information about the case at hand in order
to determine what counts as similarity in that case. According to the model
view, then, the context of the investigation is important to determine what
kind of similarity is relevant. Suppose, for example, that we want to explain
something about a quantity of water: the flow of water in a tube, the
propagation of waves in a body of water, or diffusion of a substance through
the water. Depending on the phenomenon that is to be explained, the
water has to be modelled differently – perhaps as a continuous substance of
constant density; or perhaps as a collection of individual particles in random
motion.31 With proper application of the appropriate kind of similarity, the
model view allows for the scientific modelling of a large variety of models
precisely because exactness is not present in scientific models.
It is true that scientific models take many forms, that scientists do
model substances such as water in many different ways, and that similarity
can account for this large variety of models. But this in itself has nothing
to do with the more fundamental question of how modelling itself can even
occur: it does not do any good to an account of scientific modelling to
have a greater variety of similar models if the basic issue of how a scientific
model is to be representative of a physical situation remains unsolved. That
similarity can account for the large variety of models counts in favour of the
model view, but not in a way that diminishes the particular point that the
semantic view gives a better link between a model and a physical situation
via isomorphism.
If similarity were all there is to the relation between a model and a
physical system, then that easily (provided we accept the similarity rela-
tion itself) accounts for a lot of scientific practice surrounding models, be-
31Paul Teller, ‘Twilight of the Perfect Model Model’, Erkenntnis 55 (2001), p. 401.
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cause similarity can readily accommodate the vast variety of models that
scientists use. Unfortunately, similarity cannot be all that there is to the
relation. Even if we grant that the context of the investigation is indeed
important, the project of linking models to reality, showing how models
represent reality, needs something more. Taking similarity as what con-
nects scientific models to physical situations leads to the problem that an
amalgamated model can easily be self-inconsistent. After all, the project
of understanding water as a continuous medium and the project of un-
derstanding water as a collection of discrete particles can also be seen as
separate parts of an overall project of understanding what water is. One
way to model what water is is to characterize water as being discrete, with
each individual water molecule being made up of one oxygen and two hy-
drogen atoms. But how water flows is also relevant to what water is, so
a full treatment of the question will include information that water is also
a substance that has the disposition to flow under certain conditions. In
this way, a comprehensive model of what water is contains incompatible
statements: ‘water is continuous’, and ‘water is discrete’. Such a problem
cannot be simply dismissed by bringing out the importance of context, for
it is perfectly reasonable for a scientist to be interested in the question of
what water is. Since we simply cannot ignore amalgamated models that
contain incompatible statements, we should leave open for now the ques-
tion of how scientists can use such a vast variety of models, and focus first
on how modelling is achieved at all. And since similarity, while it gives
us an easy route to that vast variety of models, runs into the problems
that we have mentioned, we should see if isomorphism does a better job at
establishing the link between a scientific model and a physical situation.
The semantic view, which takes models to represent the world through
some kind of isomorphism, provides straightforward justification for the
claim that models represent reality. The main issue with the semantic
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view is of course not that it can easily establish this link, but that our
models do not, for the reasons discussed in §3.1, exactly describe reality.
Here I present reasons why the fact that our models do not give exact
descriptions of physical situations should not rule out isomorphism as part
of the relation between physical systems and scientific models.
Recall the two considerations that give us reason to believe that our
scientific models will inevitably turn out to be inexact: the way the world
works may simply be such that it cannot be completely described in a
way that is both simple and exact, and we are just unable to process
the precise conditions of physical systems. Whether or not the world is
simple, even if we could discover both the initial conditions of the world
and the laws that apply to the world, we would still need to simplify in
order to make sense of reality. But out limited mathematical ability is a
purely pragmatic consideration that should not be allowed to determine
how models – not just models that we can use – are taken to represent
reality. How models represent reality need not be somehow related to
whether models are mathematically manageable for us. A good scientific
representation should reflect the way the world actually is, independently
of whether the world is simple, and independently of whether the laws of
physics demonstrate mathematical tractability for us.
To make sense of this point, consider the following scenario. Suppose,
for the sake of argument, that there is a group of intelligent beings with
intellectual capabilities far superior to ours. Their mathematical abilities
are to ours as our best mathematicians’ abilities are to a child who has just
learnt to count to three, to some arbitrarily superior degree. Consequently,
these beings are able to work with some mathematical problems which we
think are practically (not mathematically) intractable; for all intents and
purposes, take them to be exempt from the limitation that the way the
world is together with the laws of physics is mathematically intractable
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relative to our abilities. For this group of beings, if they had knowledge
of the way the world is as well as the correct laws of physics, they would
not be subject to any sort of mathematical incapability on their part. Let
us suppose that this group of beings is aware of the exact way the world
is, as well as physical laws that provide them with exact results. But these
laws combined with the way the world is is so complicated to us that we
have to resort to idealizations to deal with them. Now let us imagine
what the philosophers of science in this group of beings might say about
how models represent reality. They would surely not be satisfied with
saying that models represent reality via a relation of similarity, because
their models are exact, and not even overly complicated by their standards.
Why should our limitations be taken to somehow constrain the way models
represent, when there could be abstract models that explain the world
perfectly, but are unfortunately incomprehensible to us?
We should preserve commitment to at least these two principles. One,
good scientific representations reflect how the world really is. Two, mathe-
matical tractability, which is contingent on the kind of being that we are, is
unrelated to the way the physical world happens to be. Therefore, rather
than taking the similarity of our models to physical systems to be part
of what it is for them to represent, we should instead view similarity as
presenting a challenge: how our models can be good representations in
spite of being merely similar to reality. An account of scientific modelling
should retain a link between good scientific models and how the world ac-
tually is, and also account for the gap between the descriptive power of
actual scientific models and the prima facie complicated nature of physical
systems.
Christopher Pincock has presented a perfect abstract model, that he
calls the ‘matching model’, that attempts to preserve a commitment to
these two principles by fixing ‘the content of a scientific representation
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using both the features of the mathematical models and the contents of
the beliefs and intentions of the agents doing the representing.’32 If the
matching model can do this successfully, then it can answer the challenge
of needing some way to connect mathematically tractable equations, i.e.,
actual scientific models, with physical situations that do not appear to be
straightforwardly fully describable by the same equations.
We can view this strategy as having two parts: for any scientific repre-
sentation, there is the part that fixes content using features of the mathe-
matical model, and the part that fixes content using agent-relative beliefs
and intentions. Take the mathematically tractable equations that we are
used to seeing to be equation models. Somewhere in the gap between an
equation model and the physical system that it purports to represent, we
insert the matching model, a perfect abstract model that matches exactly,
by a stipulated isomorphism, all the physical properties of the physical
system, and is related to the mathematically tractable equations of actual
scientific practice by means of a mathematical transformation. In other
words, an equation model is connected via a matching model to the phys-
ical situation, and different equation models are related to one another
though various mathematical idealizations.
An important part of this account is how mathematical idealization
between different equation models is to be carried out. In order to explain
what he means by mathematical idealization, Pincock offers the example of
replacing an equation that expresses Newton’s law of cooling with one that
expresses what is known as the one-dimensional heat equation. Newton’s







32Christopher Pincock, ‘Mathematical Idealization’, Philosophy of Science 74, (2007),
p. 959.
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It can be used to relate certain physical quantities in various situations.
The paradigmatic situation for this equation is to consider two metal plates
of different temperature that are connected by some material of uniform
cross-section, such as a solid metal cylinder. Due to their temperature
difference, the plates transfer thermal energy between each other. ∆Q is
the finite quantity of heat that is transferred between the two plates, ∆t is
the time it takes for ∆Q to be transferred, κ is the thermal conductivity
of the material between the plates, A is the uniform cross-sectional area
of the material connecting the plates, and d is the separation between the
plates.












where κ is thermal conductivity, ρ is density, and s is specific heat. We
know that whatever material we apply this equation to is made up of atoms
or molecules, and that the temperature of point x at time t, contained in
the function u(x, t), depends on the movement and position of the atoms
and molecules that make up the material.
Newton’s law of cooling treats temperature differences as being finite,
similar to how those differences are handled experimentally. It assigns
no values to all points in the connecting material. It merely talks about
what is transferred from one plate to the other. The point here is not to
do with whether the quantities can be measured exactly; for our purpose
of juxtaposition with the one-dimensional heat equation here, it is enough
that Newton’s law of cooling can be expressed only in measurable, i.e., finite
quantities. Note, on the other hand, the presence of the partial derivatives
in the one-dimensional heat equation. The differentiation of u(x, t) with
respect to both x and t requires the assumption that the temperature
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distribution throughout the material is continuous, yet a material that
is made up of atoms or molecules cannot have a continuous temperature
distribution.
Idealization has of course already taken place by the time we encounter
Newton’s law of cooling: there is no real world realization of a uniform
cylinder; and certainly, further approximations become necessary once one
tries to use the equation, since measurements of the amount of heat trans-
ferred and the time taken to transfer the heat can never be exact. But in
comparison to the one-dimensional heat equation, Newton’s law of cooling
gives a more accurate reflection of what really goes on in an experiment,
because it expresses the amount of heat transferred, the difference in tem-
peratures, and so on in discrete quantities, and experiments always measure
discrete values.
In the investigation of heat transfer between metal plates, a scientist
could choose to use the model of Newton’s law of cooling or, alternatively,
the model of the one-dimensional heat equation, but he would be perform-
ing idealization in a slightly different way by using each model. Newton’s
law of cooling and the one-dimensional heat equation do not perform the
same role in a description of heat transfer, in the sense that the content
of each model is different. In replacing Newton’s law of cooling with the
one-dimensional heat equation, we turn from an equation that describes a
situation in terms of finite measurable quantities, to one that assigns mag-
nitudes to each point in the material, for different times; so even though it
is possible to derive the one-dimensional heat equation from Newton’s law
of cooling, and vice versa, mathematical idealization has to be applied. The
importance of mathematical idealization as something that allows a mod-
eller to ‘move’ between Newton’s law of cooling and the one-dimensional
heat equation is brought into focus on consideration of the fact that it is
practically impossible to move from one equation model to the matching
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model and then to another equation model.
If we introduce a matching model for the situation that the one-dimensional
heat equation or Newton’s law of cooling is supposed to describe, say for
the case of an iron bar, then we obtain a model that contains every physical
property of the system, including the positions of the iron molecules (how-
ever ‘position’ is to be cashed out), the colour of different parts of the iron
bar (however ‘colour’ is to be cashed out), and other properties that do not
appear anywhere in either equation model. Because the matching model
is stipulated to contain an abstract counterpart of every physical prop-
erty of the system, the isomorphism that connects the matching model to
the physical system arises trivially. The connection between the matching
model and the equation model is much less trivial. Pincock takes this con-
nection to be established through a mathematical transformation between
the matching model and the equation model, with the range of permissible
transformations to be specified by the intentions of the scientists doing the
modelling. In short, on this account, scientists can represent a physical
situation by means of an equation model if they believe that an appropri-
ate matching model exists (for which there is an isomorphism between it
and the physical situation), and that there is an appropriate mathematical
transformation between the equation model and the matching model.
The notion of using a perfect abstract model to establish a connection
between models and a physical system is a clever one. It provides us with
a simple view of the modelling process, and potentially allows us to fix
the content of scientific models using both the way the world is and the
intentions of the scientists. In §3.3, I suggest that the connection between
the matching model and the equation model can be made clearer with a
further abstract model, the relevant properties model.
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3.3 The relevant properties model
In §3.2, I discussed Christopher Pincock’s proposed matching model, which
attempts to preserve a commitment to having good scientific representa-
tions reflect the way the world is, and allow for the wide range of models
that scientists actually use. In this section (§3.3), I argue for the introduc-
tion of another abstract model, the relevant properties model, which we
arrive at after taking irrelevant properties out of some matching model. I
offer two reasons why the relevant properties model improves our account
of scientific modelling. The first reason is that this is makes the process
of abstraction and of idealization explicit. The second reason is that while
the matching model is a large step in the right direction in establishing an
account of scientific modelling, it leaves something to be desired about the
connection between the matching model and the equation model, namely
that scientists may well be unable to tell whether there is an appropriate
transformation between the matching model and the equation model; the
relevant properties model fills this gap.
As I discussed in §2.3.1, abstraction and idealization are two types of
scientific reasoning that are indispensable when building a model of a phys-
ical situation. In abstracting, model-builders choose to leave out irrelevant
properties from the model that they build, because they know that those
properties are ‘irrelevant’. In idealizing, we throw away all detail above
a certain level of precision, keeping only that information which is neces-
sary to make the model ‘good enough’. Both abstraction and idealization
remove some information about the situation, but one ignores irrelevant
properties, while the other ignores unnecessary detail. Both are important
in scientific reasoning, but they perform different functions, and a sepa-
ration of the process of abstraction from that of idealization clarifies the
moves that are made in scientific modelling.
Here is a seemingly innocuous statement: ‘The one-dimensional heat
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equation says something about temperature, but not about colour.’ Cer-
tainly, nowhere in the equation does a term appear to represent colour.
Colour, it would seem, is irrelevant to the model. Yet temperature and
colour are related in some circumstances: the temperature of an object
affects the colour of light that it radiates. A change in temperature also
changes which wavelength of light the object gives off most strongly, in
accordance with the object’s blackbody curve, and easily characterized by
Wien’s displacement law, which states that the most strongly radiated
wavelength of a blackbody is inversely proportional to the temperature of
the blackbody.
An in-depth consideration of how a scientific model is applied therefore
turns up ways in which the model is inadequate. For example, suppose
we use the one-dimensional heat equation to model the following situa-
tion: two plates of different temperature are connected by an iron bar of
approximately uniform thickness. The iron bar conducts heat along its
length, between the two plates. One end of the iron bar is at a low tem-
perature, while the other end is at a very high temperature. The end that
is at a high temperature is visibly glowing, as a star does because of its
high temperature. The various regions of the bar along its length all radi-
ate electromagnetic energy too, and so they have a colour associated with
them. If the bar is hot enough that it is glowing, then it is possible to
associate a ‘most intense colour’, or ‘most intense wavelength’, with each
part of the bar. And if the bar is not glowing, then we have two strategies
for determining whether such an assignment is possible.
The reason two routes are open to us here is that I have not clearly
defined what is meant by ‘colour’, and of course the scientific model says
nothing about it either. This is not a simple thing to define – discussions
about colour can take us all the way from radiation laws to qualia. Our
inability to deal with colour ‘in every sense’ forces us to adopt some reading
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of the word ‘colour’, which determined which route we take. One route is
to say that in a scientific context, by ‘colour’ we really mean ‘wavelength’.
Then there is no ‘in-principle’, structural difference between talking about
the colour (wavelength) that is most strongly radiated by a bar that is
glowing, compared with a bar that is not glowing. The other route is to
take ‘colour’ to mean colour as we experience it. In that case we could
say that when the bar is glowing, its colour is a property relevant to the
objects described by the one-dimensional heat equation; when the bar is
not glowing, then its colour is not relevant to the things described by the
one-dimensional heat equation. On the first reading, ‘colour’ is just a proxy
for ‘wavelength’, so we talk about the ‘colour’ being radiated by different
parts of the bar, even though it is not visible. And of course, we must
recognize that the bar is indeed radiating electromagnetic energy, even if
we take the second reading of ‘colour’ – namely, that colour is something
that we experience. On this second reading of ‘colour’, we find ourselves
unable to say how the colour of the bar might be incorporated in the heat
equation, so perhaps we might feel justified in doing away with it entirely
in our model of the system.
Whether we choose a particular reading of ‘colour’ over the other de-
pends on what we are interested in investigating – once again, the inten-
tions of the scientists and model-users becomes important. We may be
interested in ‘colour’ as meant by the second reading; or we may be inter-
ested in ‘colour’ on the first reading; or we may be interested in neither. By
considering the whole situation, with as much realism as we can manage,
and by considering whether to include each sense of ‘colour’ that is present
in the situation, we are forced to somehow do away with the full complexity
of real situations. Because the deep and varied ways in which situations
are complex, we abstract away information to a different extent and in a
different way depending on our interests.
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If we try to imagine what a matching model contains in the case of
a heat-conducting iron bar, there is temperature, microscopic movement,
colour-as-wavelength, colour-as-experienced-phenomenon, and innumerable
other properties which could be relevant for any one investigation. In the
case of the one-dimensional heat equation, much of this is abstracted away –
all the space–time coordinates of every individual atom (from which depen-
dent properties such as temperature may be derived), as well as properties
such as colour and roughness, are taken out when we transform from the
matching model to the equation model.
In practice, for any given equation model, the removal of properties
that are not of practical relevance is done through either abstraction or
idealization, but it is not made explicit how those properties are removed.
It is not just that certain properties are removed through abstraction, and
others through idealization. It often happens that a single property, say
friction between two surfaces, may either be abstracted away because a
surface is assumed to be smooth, or idealized away because the effect of the
friction is taken to be too small to be significant; either move is legitimate
if, say, we are just interested solving an engineering problem, because the
numerical result that is obtained in a calculation is unaffected by why we
set certain values to zero.
Yet there is a meaningful difference between removing a physical quan-
tity through abstraction and removing it through idealization.33 Consider
how the following case, posed as a textbook-style physics question, might
be modelled. A white cube of mass 25 g, resting on a smooth, flat horizon-
tal plane, is accelerated by a horizontal force. The cube obtains a speed of
1 m/s. How much energy does the force transfer to the cube?
The standard answer is, of course, 0.0125 J, and the standard method
33Yuri Balashov has observed that the property of having a physical quantity of value
zero is physically significant from not having that physical quantity at all. See Yuri
Balashov, ‘Zero-Value Physical Quantities’, Synthese 119 (1999), pp. 253–286.
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is to use what is called the work-energy theorem, which states that the
amount of work done on an object is equal to the change in kinetic energy
of the object. So the standard treatment involves calculating the change
in kinetic energy of the cube by using the values given for its mass, and its
initial and final speeds. But there are situations under which the question,
as posed, simply doesn’t give enough information for an accurate answer.
The following properties of whiteness and cube-ness, and the presence of
air resistance, are disregarded. Friction is disregarded. The nature of
application of the force is also disregarded.
The factors that are disregarded are each conceptually relevant under
the appropriate circumstances. Whiteness is relevant if the force is applied
via radiation pressure. Radiation pressure is the pressure experienced by a
surface that either absorbs or reflects photons. Each photon carries a small
amount of momentum, and when the photon is absorbed by a surface, it
transfers that small amount of momentum to the surface. If the photon is
reflected, then the surface that reflects the photon gains twice the amount
of momentum that it otherwise would from absorbing it. The colour of
a surface, as well as how shiny the surface is, affects what proportion of
incoming photons it reflects. Therefore, if shining a beam of light at the
cube is how the force is applied, then whether the cube is white or black
is relevant: white cubes reflect more light than black cubes do. It may
be objected that regardless of how many photons are used, the amount of
energy transferred in accelerating the cube to 1 m/s is still the same. Not
so. When a photon is absorbed by the cube, there is a small increase in
the temperature of the cube. This is a transfer of energy through radia-
tive heating. Furthermore, the world’s most famous equation, E = mc2,
expresses an equivalence between energy and mass, so if the cube absorbs
photons and its energy increases, so does its mass. The equivalence of mass
and energy is in fact conceptually relevant even if the force is applied via
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some other method – pushing with a stick, pulling with a rope, and so on.
Because the force causes the cube to accelerate, whatever form the force
comes in, the cube’s energy, and therefore mass, increases.
If the force is applied off-centre, then the point of application and the
angle of application of the force are also both relevant: the cube will ro-
tate in addition to undergoing translation. This aspect of the mechanics is
standardly ignored in such questions, even though it would be extremely
difficult to apply a force exactly at a point such that the cube does not
rotate. In the case of an actual textbook example, the idealization or ab-
straction is not carried out in order to make the mathematics tractable,
because the mathematical techniques to deal with rotating cubes do ex-
ist. The reason is, rather, pedagogical – it makes teaching the work-energy
theorem simpler. But it results in a pedagogical problem as well. For a
student who sincerely wonders out loud what happens in situations with
air resistance, whether how the force is applied matters, and why the block
doesn’t rotate, the answer one might expect him to receive is that such
factors are irrelevant to the question. But it is an important point that
all these factors are in fact not entirely irrelevant to the situation, and
certainly far from irrelevant to the modelling process.
Factors such as colour, and how the force is applied, that are idealized
or abstracted away during the standard treatment of the situation, are
not irrelevant to the modelling process because part of that process is
considering them and then eliminating them. The colour of the cube, if light
is present, is relevant. But in cases where the force is a lot larger than the
force generated by radiation pressure, the force due to radiation pressure
is idealized away for being too small. In fact, this need not be the case –
given enough time, radiation pressure would have no trouble accelerating
an object of the stated mass. Radiation pressure is even attributed with
causing large objects such as asteroids to drift close to Earth over long
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periods of time. And since radiation pressure could well be relevant, but
probably only happens to be very small, it is taken to bear no influence on
the outcome. So it is idealized, as opposed to abstracted, away.
If the process takes place in air, then air resistance is a factor; consider-
ing the speeds involved, it would probably be said that the air resistance is
too small to be a factor. As the dimensions of the cube are not mentioned,
it makes sense to wonder if the cube has a very large surface area, such
that air resistance is significant even at 1 m/s. And if the cube is small, the
air resistance is low, and is idealized, rather than abstracted, away. But
it may be abstracted away if the entire process takes place in a vacuum,
because then it is not just low, but zero – no air, so no air resistance.
Suppose there is a case in which it is possible to take a subset of prop-
erties in the matching model and transform between those properties and
the equation model. Now suppose that instead of having abstraction and
idealization both happen during this transformation, we consider abstrac-
tion first. Only the properties that a scientist working with the equation
model are left – for this particular case, this is the relevant properties
model. In this case, the relevant properties model comprises only math-
ematical entities which exactly parallel those physical properties, and are
relevant to the intentions of the scientists. Only after we have obtained the
relevant properties model through abstraction do we need to think about
how idealization occurs. Contrast this with an account of scientific mod-
elling that incorporates a matching model, but not a relevant properties
model. If the matching model contains irrelevant properties such as colour
and roughness, then idealization and abstraction occur at the same step,
namely the mathematical transformation between the matching model and
the equation model. My suggestion is that the abstraction should explic-
itly be performed entirely separately from the idealization. This makes the
process neater, and sharpens the distinction between what the process of
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abstraction produces, and what the process of idealization produces.
In short, we are well served in at least two ways by separating the pro-
cesses of idealization and abstraction, the first being that doing so makes
each of the two processes explicit. But understanding what idealization and
abstraction are, and appreciating the difference between them, is important
to having a meta-understanding of scientific practice. Not realizing that
we use both abstraction and idealization to go from the matching model
to the equation model means that there is an important piece of the pro-
cess that is missing from our meta-understanding of the modelling process.
The details are important – this is why it is important to know, for exam-
ple, whether models represent by isomorphism or by similarity. Knowing
where abstraction and idealization occur is simply part of understanding
the modelling process. Knowing how we go from real system to matching
model to relevant properties model to equation model reveals something
about how we have modelled the system – not just how in a broad sense,
but how in a detailed way, by revealing the reasoning that went into the
modelling process. For these reasons, it is important to know why we have
removed a property that is present in a real system but not in a model that
represents the system.
The second reason is that while scientists’ intentions and beliefs clearly
attach to the equation model, they do not always attach to the matching
model. We can have a clearer understanding of this problem if we un-
derstand how an equation model is to be linked to the matching model.
Supposedly, the matching model is mathematically transformed into equa-
tion models in their many forms, depending on what scientists want to do.
But I do not think that scientists even transform between a matching model
and an equation model directly, as they grapple with how to model various
real systems. Therefore, to have the transformation include abstraction
and idealization at the same step is too simplistic.
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I will show, by reference to the properties (including the non-physical
properties) that are present in real situations, why scientists’ intentions and
beliefs do not attach to real situations directly, and that scientists do not
transform between the matching model and the equation model. It is worth
mentioning that Pincock’s account of the matching model does not insist
that scientists be able to actually transform between a matching model
and an equation model; they merely need to believe that there exists a
suitable transformation between matching model and equation model. But
this sets the bar too low: we have no guarantee that scientists are able
to tell whether there really is such a transformation. Therefore, a more
full-blooded connection between scientists’ intentions and beliefs and the
matching model is needed, so that we do not end up simply relocating the
mystery in the modelling process.
A real situation can have many aspects to it, both physical and non-
physical. Consider, for example, a bunch of marbles colliding with one
another, which is studied under the heading of collisions between rigid ob-
jects; a golf ball flying through the air, which is textbook fodder in Fluid
Dynamics; a piece of steaming hot bread, which could be a chance to talk
about all three modes of heat transfer, depending on whom you ask. At the
same time, a bag of marbles may be looked upon nostalgically by someone
who remembers playing with marbles during his or her childhood; a golf
ball flying through the air may remind someone of Tiger Woods’s scandal;
a piece of hot bread may remind a homeless ex-banker of his past glory
on Wall Street. So while all of these situations may be viewed from the
perspective of their physical properties, they may also be viewed from re-
ligious, ethical, sociological, political, or economic perspectives which have
little to do with the physics involved. Let us suppose that a scientist is
modelling one of these systems. Does he have in mind the real system?
Of course there is some sense in which the scientist does consider the real
81
system. Most scientists are interested in more than just the science in-
volved in systems, so of course a consideration of the system’s non-physical
properties is open to the scientist as well. But it is unlikely that the scien-
tist, in modelling any one of these situations, has the real situation in mind.
When modelling a system, the scientist does not think of the socio-political
ramifications that a situation might have, even if they comprise some of
his extra-scientific concerns. So even though the scientist might be able
to appreciate the many facets of a situation, and his intentions and beliefs
might attach to those aspects of a real situation when he reads opinion
articles on some event and thinks about the different ways of looking at it,
his intentions and beliefs do not attach to all those non-physical properties
of the situation while working with a scientific model of the situation.
Clearly, then, a scientist’s intentions and beliefs do not attach to a real
situation in its full complexity. This does not, in itself, rule out the pos-
sibility that the scientist’s intentions and beliefs might attach to all the
physical properties of a situation – in other words, to the matching model.
Nonetheless, I assert that this does not actually happen. In modelling a sit-
uation, a scientist’s intentions and beliefs attach to only a very small subset
of all the physical properties in a situation in such as way as to allow an
equation model to be formed. The scientist is of course aware that there
are other physical properties that are attributable to the physical situation,
though he may not be aware of precisely what these properties are. Since
the scientist is aware that there is a matching model that contains math-
ematical analogues of all the physical properties of the physical situation,
it is not true that the scientist’s beliefs and intentions do not attach at all
to this model. But since the scientist is able to incorporate a small subset
of these physical properties in equation models, but unable to incorporate
the other properties in the matching model in building equation models,
there must be some crucial difference in just how the scientist’s beliefs and
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intentions attach to properties in each case.
I would like to distinguish between two senses of ‘connectedness’ by
which a scientist’s beliefs and intentions may attach to a situation, namely,
‘strong’ connectedness and ‘weak’ connectedness. Strong and weak con-
nectedness are properties of a scientist’s intentionality towards a physical
situation, thus we may take a scientist’s intentions to attach strongly or
weakly to situations. They come in degrees, but juxtaposition makes it
easier to see their relevance to modelling.
Let us consider, broadly, the universe. A scientist can think about the
universe, of course, but he cannot model the universe. A scientist might
model the expansion of the universe by considering a Big Bang model and
a chosen spacetime metric, but this is not the same as modelling the whole
universe; it is instead modelling particular aspects of the universe as a
whole. The real situation obviously contains more information than any
scientist would be able to handle. Yet although the complexity of the uni-
verse is intractable, even in thinking through this example we can focus our
thoughts on the universe, and form beliefs about the universe as a whole. In
a way, then, it should be acknowledged that our intentions and beliefs can
connect to a real situation, even one as complex as the entire universe. But
note that this sort of connection is not of a sort that is conducive to mod-
elling. A scientist cannot, in this way, focus his thoughts on the immense
complexity of the entire universe, and thereby justify whatever equations
he has that purportedly represent various parts of the universe – science
is not that easy. (At least, to echo the point about our being creatures of
limited intellect, science is not that easy for us.) I will refer to this sense of
connectedness, in which a scientist’s beliefs and intentions are connected to
a real situation, as ‘weak connectedness’; phrased differently, the scientist’s
beliefs and intentions are ‘weakly connected’ or ‘weakly attached’ to the
real situation. While I may call this ‘weak’ connectedness, it has nothing to
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do with the strength of the scientist’s beliefs about whatever he is thinking
about. When we talk about a ‘real situation’, our own thoughts connect
weakly to whatever situation we have in mind. But it does not preclude
us from having strong beliefs about the way the situation is as a whole. A
religious person may have very strong beliefs about the universe, but that
does not mean he is in a position to model the universe. Connectedness
of a different sort is required for scientific modelling. We have to ground
the relation of strong connectedness in something other than strength of
belief or intentionality, in a way that accurately reflects the mental process
of scientific modelling.
I shall call the sort of connectedness of beliefs and intentions that al-
lows us to model a situation ‘strong connectedness’. A scientist’s beliefs
and intentions are strongly connected to a model just in case for each kind
of property contained in the model, the scientist intends to model those
properties, and is justified in believing that there is a mathematical trans-
formation between the model under consideration and the equation model.
I shall illustrate what I mean by strong connectedness by reference to how
a scientist might regard the relevant properties model. In talking about
the one-dimensional heat equation, I noted that it assigns a temperature
to every spatial location within in the iron bar. Because the iron bar is
made of discrete particles, we cannot sensibly talk about temperature at
the scale of an atom; yet, that is what a scientist is doing when he models
a heat-conducting iron bar using the one-dimensional heat equation.
The difference between strong and weak connectedness has to do with
how well a scientist understands the mathematical transformation, and how
well the scientist is able to handle the overall complexity of the situation
under consideration. This overall complexity is not limited to physical com-
plexity, and it includes non-physical properties as well, so how exhaustively
the scientist is aware of all the properties of the situation is also a consider-
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ation determining the degree of connectedness of his intentions to the sit-
uation. In the case of the iron bar being modelled by the one-dimensional
heat equation, ‘a scientist believes that a transformation exists between the
real situation (or mathematical analogue thereof) and the equation model’
has to be given this interpretation: the scientist believes that there is some
transformation such that the transformation produces the one-dimensional
heat equation from a mathematical analogue of all the physical proper-
ties of the heat-conducting iron bar. But if the scientist is aware of just
how the transformation occurs, then there is some specific mathematical
transformation such that the scientist believes that that particular math-
ematical transformation produces the one-dimensional heat equation from
the mathematical analogue of all the relevant physical properties of the
heat-conducting iron bar.
What does a scientist think he is describing when he applies the one-
dimensional heat equation, which assigns a temperature to every point
along the iron bar? Certainly not the real situation, which is a collection
of discrete particles in random motion, of which some particles move more
vigorously than others, and certainly not the quantum mechanical view
of these particles. The one-dimensional heat equation does not describe
the real situation directly, because it deals with temperatures at exact
locations, but the temperature-at-a-point is not a property of the real sit-
uation. The temperature-at-a-point is a property that the scientist has in
mind when he models the real situation using the one-dimensional heat
equation, but it is not a part of the real situation when we think of the real
situation in the most accurate way that we can. The most accurate way
we have of picturing the real situation is as a collection of discrete particles
in random motion, although in a quantum mechanical rather than ‘billiard
balls’ fashion, and temperature is not part of this picture.
Let us have a look at what each of the following contains in this case
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– the case of a heat-conducting iron bar – in increasing order of how far
removed each one is from the real situation: the real situation; the match-
ing model; the relevant properties model; and the equation model. We will
look at each of these and consider how the scientist’s intentions and beliefs
attach to them. The real situation has a ‘full’ set of properties – including
properties other than those that the scientist is interested in modelling.
Suppose, for example, that the iron bar costs thirty cents to produce, or is
made from iron from an old broadsword that once bore some historical sig-
nificance (such as belonging to a king). The scientist has no way of knowing
all such non-physical properties of the iron bar, and just as importantly,
the scientist is not interested in such trivia as far as modelling is concerned.
So the scientist’s beliefs and intentions are not strongly connected to the
real situation. 34
The matching model of a real system is a mathematical analogue of
every physical property in it, established by stipulation. None of the prop-
erties that have nothing to do with physics, so properties such as being
feared and goodness35, are not included in the matching model. But the
matching model of the situation contains all the physical properties of the
situation: the property of being 100 m away from a tree is a physical prop-
erty, so it is included in the matching model; the property of containing
as many electrons as there are stars in the universe is a physical property,
so it too is included in the matching model. But these physical properties
are not what the scientist has in mind when he models the situation using
the equation model! The scientist has in mind properties such as, say, the
34I take the broader point to stand even in the case of physicalism being true, as
the scientist would still have no way of knowing all the relational physical properties of
the iron bar, such as, say, that the iron was produced in fusion reactions just before a
supernova some tens of billions of years ago.
35Of course, some philosophers do not believe that goodness qualifies as a property,
and fewer still would ascribe it to physical systems. The example still stands if, instead
of goodness, we substitute any other non-physical property within the moral framework
– rationality, pleasurableness, virtue, and so on, and we examine a system that physically
includes an ostensible bearer of this property.
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temperatures at various points, the positions of those points along the iron
rod, the length of time that passes after a certain state of the system, the
temperature difference between the ends of the bar – physical properties
that the equation refers to, and perhaps a few closely and obviously re-
lated properties, but nothing as far removed from the equation model as
the property of being 100 m away from a tree. Physical properties such as
being 100 m away from a tree and containing as many electrons as there are
stars in the universe are just as irrelevant to the content of the equation
model as non-physical properties such as being feared by someone. The
matching model contains a large number of physical properties that the
scientist does not intend to model, so the scientist’s intentions and beliefs
typically connect only weakly to the matching model.
Could there be a case in which the scientist’s beliefs connect strongly
to the matching model? Yes, but I do not think there is such a case for
us. This brings us back to the point about why we have to simplify: we
are not a kind of being that is able to process all the mathematics and
information that would be needed to deal with the full complexity of a
physical situation. And it should remind us of the related point that our
account of modelling should not be constrained by the kind of being that
we are, even though our acts of modelling themselves are. In the case that
there is a superhuman being capable of dealing with all the complexity of
the matching model, along with a very sophisticated equation model that
takes into account all those physical properties that we have ignored in
our equation models, then that superhuman being’s intentions and beliefs
are strongly connected to the matching model. So the scientist’s thoughts
are strongly connected to the matching model only in this contrived case
of a superhuman intelligence for whom the full physical complexity of the
situation is not intractable, and are typically only weakly connected to the
matching model; conceptually, for the scientist’s thoughts and the matching
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model to be strongly connected is possible, and depends also on the kind
of scientist involved.
Strong and weak connectedness therefore also admit of degrees. The be-
liefs and intentions of a scientist who has great familiarity with Newton’s
laws of motion, having worked with them for many years, can be strongly
connected to the equation model in a dynamical situation involving simple
rigid bodies; however, for reasons previously discussed, they can only be
weakly connected to a real situation involving solids of various approxi-
mate shaped. Depending on the calibre of the scientist, the complexity
of the situation, and other factors that arguably make it easier or more
complicated for the scientist to understand the going-on in a model, the
beliefs and intentions of the scientist may be more strongly or more weakly
connected to some intermediate model.
For a scientist to model a situation properly, his intentions and beliefs
are typically strongly connected to the relevant properties model. That is
why it is the ‘relevant properties’ model – the properties that it contains
are relevant! All and only those properties that are needed for the equation
model to be properly understood and applied are part of the relevant prop-
erties model. If the equation model is well understood, then the properties
that the scientist has in mind, the properties that are contained in the
relevant properties model, and the properties referenced by the equation
model are coextensive. But the relevant properties model and the matching
model are different, and only converge in the case of the aforementioned
superhuman intelligence.
In this section, I have illustrated the role of a relevant properties model,
that sits between the matching model and the equation model in the process
scientific modelling, which makes the steps of simplification explicit, and
accurately reflects how the scientists’ thoughts attach to the properties at
a particular stage of modelling. In §3.4 I will discuss in the structure of
88
scientific modelling in greater detail.
3.4 The structure of scientific modelling
We have been able to see how scientists’ beliefs and intentions connect to a
real situation and the various intermediate models, including the relevant
properties model, a consideration of which I have argued clarifies the pro-
cess of scientific modelling significantly. We are now in a position to offer
a more complete account of scientific modelling, one that incorporates the
various considerations that we have mentioned so far. The structure so far
has looked roughly like this:
1. The real situation has all the physical and non-physical properties.
2. The matching model is a proper subset of all the properties of the
real situation, containing only the physical properties.
3. The relevant properties model retains only those properties in the
matching model that are relevant to the scientist’s intentions and
beliefs.
4. The equation model expresses a mathematical relation that various
properties in the relevant properties model bear to each other.
5. The scope of the properties contained in the relevant properties model
ranges from being coextensive the matching model to being coexten-
sive with those examined by the equation model.
This basic structure will serve as a basis for establishing a general account of
scientific modelling. In this section (§3.4), I examine the role of experiments
in scientific modelling and use it to extend this basic structure of scientific
modelling.
Experiments are physical models that play an important role in the val-
idation of other scientific models by providing measured values of physical
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properties that are either consistent with or rule out various models. Thus
the role of experiments in scientific modelling is a crucial one that comple-
ments the real situation, matching model, relevant properties model, and
equation model that make up structure that we have built up so far. (Here
I establish the role of experiments in the context of scientific modelling ; I
do not mean to suggest that philosophers and historians of science should
pay any less attention to experiment than to theory – a situation that may
once have been but certainly is no longer the case, as the importance of
experiments is now well-recognized.36)
The wide range of experiments means that it will not be possible to
find a place for experiments in the structure of scientific modelling that
is simplistically analogous to that of the various models discussed so far.
That is, experiments are not simply another kind of model, like the match-
ing model or relevant properties model, that occupy some position in the
structure and are placed closer or further from the real situation than the
other models in our working structure of scientific modelling. Although
experiments are a kind of physical model, they are not necessarily closer
to the real situation than the equation model: there are cases in which
the experiment just is the real situation itself, in which case the experi-
ment is then necessarily closer to the real situation than even the matching
model is; and there are cases in which the experiment is perhaps some scale
model or not exactly similar physical model, in which case it may be only
as close to the real situation as the equation model is. Since we are seeking
a general account of scientific modelling, it is prima facie troublesome that
experiments should take so many different guises. But this is not an in-
surmountable difficulty, as it simply underscores the versatility of function
that is a characteristic of experiments in general, and can ultimately be
taken into account in deciding just what sort of thing experiments are.
36Ian Hacking, ‘Philosophers of Experiment’, Philosophy of Science Association 1988
(1989), pp. 147–156.
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Here are some questions regarding experiments, the answers to which
will inform the place that experiments have in the structure of scientific
modelling; I will therefore use these questions as a starting point to talk
about the properties of experiments. One, what is the purpose of having
experiments? However we situate experiments within our modelling struc-
ture has to satisfy this. Two, what is the value in having experiments?
Note how this is different from their purpose – experiments may provide
valuable functions or possess desirable characteristics that are secondary to
their purpose. And if we keep these two things distinct then we can prevent
a conflation of the purpose of experiments from their valuable functions.
Three, how are experiments related to each of the models that we have
examined; are experiments particularly strongly related to any particular
one? Some of these questions might seem straightforward, but they are im-
portant, as they will remind us of the commitments that we need to keep
while incorporating experiments into our account of scientific modelling.
What is the purpose of having experiments? In short, it is to provide
empirical verification or falsification of scientific models. I say ‘models’
and not ‘theories’ here because models are by definition more limited in
scope than theories are, and experiments are generally not suited to pro-
viding support for the whole range of models that could comprise a theory.
Providing support for a model invariably provides support for some the-
ory or other. In a case where the model is clearly narrower in scope than
the theory, the experiment directly provides support for the model, while
something on top of an analysis of experimental results will be needed to
support the theory as a whole. It is not difficult to come up with a theory
that purportedly describes the world, but a bad theory will quickly be no-
ticed for the failure of its associated models to provide predictions that are
consistent with practical observations. On the other hand, if the models
that are associated with a theory produce predictions that are consistent
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with practical observations, this puts the theory in a favourable light. As
experiments are a source of practical observations, they are indispensable
to scientific practice. But their role in scientific modelling is not primarily
one of representation, but of providing support for models, which do repre-
sent real situations. Agreement between a model and an experiment may
strengthen scientists’ beliefs in the model.
Experiments are indispensable in scientific modelling because of their
functions in model-building, and worries about how they come to represent
may be put to rest, because that is not the main function of experiments.
The important issues surrounding experiments are how they may provide
support for models, and what kind of agreement is needed between an
experiment and a model in order to strengthen a scientist’s belief that the
model is an accurate representation of a real situation.
As we saw in §2.3.3, one of the important functions of experiments
is to exemplify particular properties in a physical system. We achieve
exemplification when we model a real situation in a concrete way. While
exemplification is something useful that experiments, as physical models of
real situations, bring to our modelling process, the fact that experiments
can achieve exemplification means that experiments do not display all the
properties of the real situation, and this raises the issue of how experiments,
more specifically concrete models, come to represent. Now, how models
come to represent is certainly important, but that is because representation
is the main function of a scientific model qua scientific model, or at least one
function that is necessary for the scientific model to be useful. On the other
hand, representation is not the main function of experiments. Experiments
are physical models, but they are physical models used in a limited and
specific way, namely, to provide epistemic support for theories. The purpose
of experiments is the verification of theories, and lending support to (or
alternatively, discrediting) theories is the main function of experiments. If
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an experiment is taken to represent a real situation, this may well detract
from the main purpose of the experiment, which is to provide empirical
support, in the form of agreeable data, for some other model (such as an
equation model) that expresses a relational property between the properties
under consideration in the model. Any representational function of an
experiment is over and above this.
This reveals, in part, why it is business as usual for scientists in spite
of the prima facie worry about how experiments can come to represent.
In the overall picture of scientific modelling, the representational function
of experiments is simply not essential to their main function within sci-
ence. Scientists can carry out the process of scientific modelling rather well
without knowing exactly how it works.
I turn now to another very useful property of some experiments, namely,
repeatability. Not all experiments are repeatable – for example, in an ex-
periment to measure the energy of a gamma-ray burst from a supernova,
the experimental setup is not in the control of the scientsts. Repeatability
provides several valuable functions. One of these functions is related to
the impossibility of obtaining exact results. In this context, ‘impossibility
of obtaining exact results’ pertains not to how some model fits the world,
but to the precision and accuracy of measurements of physical quantities
that are obtained from an experiment. Repeating an experiment results in
increasing accuracy. Another useful function of repeatable experiments is
in allowing its results to be potentially reproduced – not reproduced ex-
actly, of course, but any worry about exact reproduction is just a narrower
version of the worry about exact results in general. If an experiment is re-
peatable, then the results that a scientist obtains can, at least in principle,
be supported or contradicted by the results that other scientists obtain.
This in turn can lead to consensus about the findings of an experiment.
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A clarification about my use of the term ‘experiment’ is appropriate
here. I have mentioned the usefulness of repeatability, and have also stated
that not all experiments are repeatable. This raises the question: What
about the function of experiments that are not repeatable? I likely diverge
from some on whether such concrete models may be called experiments:
some may feel that experiments are, by their very nature, repeatable; this
is fine, but then those who are inclined towards this use of the term ‘ex-
periments’ then have to come up with another word for those concrete
models that are not repeatable. The issue here is not ‘merely’ semantic.
In choosing to use ‘experiment’ to refer to those kinds of concrete model
that generally come to mind when the term is brought out, models that
are repeatable and help to achieve exemplification, and also to refer to
those kinds of concrete model that are not repeatable and may not even
achieve exemplification, it becomes more important that I draw attention
to the differences between these two kinds of experiment, and treat them
appropriately. To employ the term ‘experiments’ to refer only to repeat-
able concrete representations; to coin or otherwise claim another term for
nonrepeatable concrete representations; and to do so yet again for concrete
representations that do or do not achieve exemplification – this emphasizes
the differences in function between these different kinds of concrete model.
But while the differences are important, all these kinds of model have quite
a lot in common with regards to their role in the modelling process, so it
will do to refer to them all by the same term.
According to the picture that I have built up so far, experiments are not
just concrete models in general, but concrete models used for a particular
primary purpose – namely, to provide epistemic support for models. So
even though different kinds of experiment might have different properties
and functions in modelling, all of them have the same purpose, which unifies
them in the same category within the structure of scientific modelling.
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I propose to examine a few concrete examples that involve different
kinds of experiment. Now, it might seem ideal to provide an exhaustive
survey of all the different kinds of experiment and show how each one of
them fits into the modelling structure. But this will not be an exhaustive
review of the different kinds of experiment, not just because such a review
would be extremely difficult to do, but also because attempting to do so
would be to ignore an important fact about experiments. Experiments,
like scientific models in general, are not the sort of thing that can be given
clear boundaries and a well-defined set of essential properties. We can talk
about models in general but also engage in a meaningful discourse about
the different types of scientific model; we cannot simply define a set of
properties that all models essentially share and be done with them. And
so it is, in a similar way, with experiments. We have gone over some of
the general properties of experiments, and we can point out some things
that all experiments have in common, but this does not allow us to define
a set of properties that all experiments essentially have. It speaks to the
inventiveness of scientists that myriad experiments exist that test the many
different models in science, and one would be ill-advised to attempt to
pigeonhole these into restrictive categories – as new models are conceived
and put to use, so too must new experiments be born, and no top-down
definition should result in a restriction on these.
While experiments may differ in function, all of them share the same
purpose – namely, to support scientific models. This is the role that all
of them have in common, that I think is partially constitutive of what
experiments are, and is the major role that experiments play in scientific
modelling. This relation between experiments and models also goes some
way to providing an explanation from the fact that models are not the kind
of thing that can be restricted by defining a set of properties that all models
essentially share to the fact that experiments are not the kind of thing
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that can be restricted by defining a set of properties that all experiments
essentially share. Since the range of possible models cannot be limited, and
the role of experiments is to provide support for models, we cannot restrict
the range of possible experiments either.
The sort of analysis I will do for the examples to come can be done for
any experiment that comes along. For each of the following examples, I will
see how each of them specifically fulfills its purpose of providing support
for a certain model. For the first example, I would like to make it continu-
ous with a model that I already described earlier, the one-dimensional heat
equation, which by now needs no introduction. Imagine an experiment
that provides support for the one-dimensional heat equation – not that it
is designed in such a way that its results necessarily support that particular
equation, but that it is designed to gather data that is relevant to the equa-
tion model. In such a case what are scientists to look for? A scientist who
is interested in investigating the one-dimensional heat equation is likely to
look at the equation to begin. Now, different people internalize informa-
tion in different ways, so I cannot prescribe just what steps a scientist must
take to understand the equation model. But is possible to discern what
concepts a scientist has to know. Note that I am not currently dealing
with that sort of case in which a scientist uses the one-dimensional heat
equation in order to come to an understanding of what one of the relevant
physical quantities is, such as trying to understand what ‘temperature’ is
by first using the equation as a sort of working definition. I exclude such
cases because they require information not just of how scientists model,
but how they incorporate new concepts by reference to their existing ones;
an account can of course be given, but this is not the place for it.
For the case I have in mind, in order to understand the equation, the
scientist must at least understand what each of the terms in the equation
model means. Let us suppose that the scientist understands what is meant
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by ‘temperature’, ‘postion’, ‘thermal conductivity’, ‘specific heat’, and the
other terms in the heat equation, and he also understands the mathemat-
ics, such as partial derivatives and arithmetic operations, expressed in the
equation model itself. So for this case of the one-dimensional heat equa-
tion, the scientist understands the equation model at face value, and he
understands what the equation expresses. He also understands that the
equation model talks not just about ‘temperature’ and ‘position’ but also
‘temperature-at-a-point’.
So how does the scientist investigate the one-dimensional heat equation?
Since he understands the mathematics, his intentions connect strongly to
the equation model. And since he knows what physical properties the equa-
tion model refers to, his intentions also connect strongly to the relevant
properties model. The scientist then needs to collect data to investigate
these properties. This involves taking measurements in a suitable way to
determine the physical quantities that are involved. In the case of the one-
dimensional heat equation, the scientist has to measure what is normally
referred to as the temperature at various points. The scientist might, per-
haps, measure the temperature at various regions along the length of the
iron bar by using a thermocouple, which is able to detect temperature dif-
ferences between two ends of two different wires. One end of wire can be
kept at a precisely known temperature, while the other end of wire is used
to determine the difference between the precisely known temperature and
the temperature of a wire-end–sized region of the iron bar.
We have noted that there is no such real quantity at a point, because
when the region that is investigated is of a small enough scale, it no longer
makes sense to talk about the temperature in that region. Nonetheless,
this may not be revealed by the scientist’s experiments to verify the one-
dimensional heat equation. An experiment that measures, ostensibly, the
temperature over a region of space will produce results that look perfectly
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fine. It would look to a scientist as though the experiment really is mea-
suring the temperature that is instantiated at every point in a region of
space, and this data does not give the scientist any positive reason to doubt
that this region can be arbitrarily small. On the other hand, an experi-
ment that ostensibly measures the temperature at various regions also does
not give any direct support for their being such a thing as temperature-
at-a-point. The scientist’s beliefs about whether there is such a physical
property called temperature-at-a-point may be affected by the experiment
in the following way: in determining the temperature over wire-sized re-
gions along the length of the iron bar, and seeing that this data falls within
an acceptable range of the value predicted by the equation model, it might
seem to the scientist that this quantity called ‘temperature’ does useful ex-
planatory work, and this gives the scientist reason to believe in it. But this
is not evidence for temperature-at-a-point: doing explanatory work does
not necessarily mean that something exists. Any explanatory gap can be
superficially filled by reference to a fictitious quantity – or, for that matter,
fictitious entity.
So the purpose of the experiment involving the thermocouple and the
heat-conducting iron bar is to test the one-dimensional heat equation. And
therefore the experiment can provide support for the equation model. It
does not, however, directly test whether there is such a thing as temperature-
at-a-point, and so it does not provide support for at least that part of the
relevant properties model. By contrast, here is an experiment that would
test whether there is such a thing as temperature-at-a-point, with the em-
phasis on testing whether there is temperature at a point. If there is tem-
perature at a point, and temperature is a property of the material, then
the material has to be continuous so that temperature can be instantiated
at every point in the material. So an experiment to probe the structure
of iron would suffice – perhaps something similar to Lord Rayleigh’s ex-
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periment involving firing high-energy particles at gold foil, with the aim
of deducing the structure of the foil by noting how the particles were de-
flected, but using iron foil instead. And it would disprove, like Rayleigh’s
gold foil experiment did for gold, that the material of the iron bar is con-
tinuous. But it could have been the case that instead of being deflected by
or allowed through the foil in a way that indicated the presence of discrete
particles in the foil, the high energy particles are deflected in a way that is
consistent with the material being continuous. If this were the case, then
the temperature-at-a-point component of relevant properties model that
corresponds to the equation model of the one-dimensional heat equation
would pass this particular test of its existence. So the modified iron foil
experiment can serve as an experiment aimed at testing a particular part
of the relevant properties model.
Here is a possible doubt regarding whether the modified iron foil exper-
iment tests whether there is such a thing as temperature at a point while
the heat-conducting iron bar experiment does not: nothing that comes out
of the iron bar experiment contradicts the notion that there is such a thing
as temperature at a point. Scientific experiments do not, strictly speaking,
prove models, but fail to disprove models; over time, the scientific process
leads to good theories since bad models are weeded out. This worry actu-
ally reveals something about what models we can take an experiment to
support. We have seen two experiments which each test a different model.
Neither of these experiments contradicts the continuous medium model of
wave propagation, but I do not think anyone would take this to mean that
either of these experiments provides any support to it. I propose that the
relevance of an experiment to a situation can be characterized partially
by the presence of a function that we have already discussed: exemplifica-
tion. In our earlier discussion of exemplification, we saw that an experiment
could only exemplify certain properties of a physical situation. Because the
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experiments that we have looked at are fairly specific, they only exemplify
certain properties that may be present in a physical situation, and that
are present in an equation model or relevant properties model that is to be
investigated. Exemplification, one of the common functions of an experi-
ment, is crucial to being able to use an experiment to provide support for a
model. The relationship that I propose between exemplification and using
an experiment to provide support for a model is this: If an experiment E
exemplifies a property P, and a model M contains property P, then exper-
iment E may be used to support model M. I do not take the ability of an
experiment to support a model to be solely dependent on exemplification,
however, because there are cases where exemplification is not part of the
experiment yet the experiment is able to support a model.
Here then is an example of an experiment that is not a vehicle of ex-
emplification, but can achieve the same result in terms of being able to
support a model because of the intentions of the scientists who are doing
the modelling. This experiment is not repeatable, and as such is quite dif-
ferent from the iron bar experiment and the iron foil experiment. I have in
mind an experiment to determine the properties of a supernova, in which
case the concrete model just is the supernova itself. Stars that are some 25
times more massive than the Sun eventually undergo an extremely large
and violent explosion called a supernova, in which most of their matter is
forcefully driven outwards into space. The extremely hot conditions and
intense gravitational forces present in the star just before and during this
process are unlike anything on that we see on Earth, so it is impossible to
recreate such a process in a controlled experiment. In this case, the con-
crete model that serves as a source of data, that is, the experiment, just is
the real situation itself. No exemplification is present in this case and yet
the experiment yields data which is used to test existing equation models
that describe it.
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Perhaps, instead of saying that experiments are vehicles of exemplifica-
tion, we should say that controlled experiments are vehicles of exemplifica-
tion, for it is only for such experiments that certain features or properties
are brought to the fore. Admittedly I am using the term ‘experiments’ in a
broader non-standard way here, as physical models that are used to support
an equation model or relevant properties model. Given this usage, experi-
ments do not always have to take place under very narrow circumstances,
as Cartwright has asserted for the case of controlled experiments. In the
case of a supernova, nothing is exemplified. No properties are isolated by
the experiment, and none of the conditions under which the experiment
takes place are contrived. So how does the experiment provide data in
order to support a model in this case? Such cases, where exemplification
is not achieved, rely on the agent-relative beliefs and intentions in order
for the experiment to work. Even when no exemplification is present, the
equation model and the relevant properties models are supported by data
collected from the experiment that happens to be the real situation. And
this is so because only certain kinds of properties are treated as data for
the model. This process of isolating certain properties depends on agent-
relative beliefs in such a way that only certain properties are selected by
the scientists. This is the other part of how this sort of experiment can
support a model – it is not that it exemplifies certain properties present in
that model, but that scientists select from it certain properties present in
the model.
In summary, the place that experiments play in scientific modelling is
primarily determined by their purpose. Experiments are physical models
that are intended to provide support for a model, either a relevant prop-
erties model or an equation model. Experiments can only provide support
for a model if they exemplify a property that the model contains, or if the
scientists who are carrying out the modelling select a property of the ex-
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periment to form part of their data. Experiments therefore play a crucial
but supporting role in scientific modelling. Scientists build models, most
notably equation models – as scientific disciplines mature, they develop
equation models for more aspects of their investigation, and experiments
come in to provide epistemic support for these equation models.
We have so far established what the structure of scientific modelling



















Figure 1: The structure of scientific modelling. Agent-relative beliefs
attach strongly to the equation model and relevant properties model, but –
at least for beings like us – attach weakly to to the matching model and real
situation. Experiments in their various forms support these diverse models.
The asterisks distinguish between different experiments: an experiment to
support a relevant properties model and one to support an equation model
will be different.
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An interesting part of the structure of scientific modelling that I have
not yet said much about, and which bears further investigation, is the link
between the matching model and the relevant properties model. In §4,
particularly §4.1, I discuss this link between the relevant properties model
and the matching model.
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4 Implications
In this section (§4) I discuss the link between the matching model and the
relevant properties model. I show that the structure of scientific modelling
that we have built up so far bears on the issue of emergence in scientific
models, by locating it between the matching model and the relevant prop-
erties model. This is not to say that emergence is the relation between
the matching model and the relevant properties model, but that in cases
in which emergence is apparent, that is where it manifests itself.
Emergence has been a significant topic in several fields. I do not argue
for a particular conception of emergence in general, as emergence seems
to have attracted attention in very different fields, the full gamut of which
runs far beyond the scope of this work. While some have tried to explain
these with a single framework, I think that we currently have insufficient
understanding of all related fields to reliably do so. Therefore, we will not
deal with the full complexity of the related debates, because this is well
beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, in the philosophy of mind,
where its status has implications for the mind–body problem, and whether
mental states can be reduced to physical states; however, the relationship
between physical states and mental states is not well understood, and in
fact even the range of physical and mental states alone defies straightfor-
ward categorization. This is a marked difference from our understanding of
phenomena that we are able to model in science; the structure of scientific
modelling is very different from the structure of concepts that have to do
with mind and body.
In §4.2 I discuss what seems to be the emergence of ‘temperature’ for
the case of the one-dimensional heat equation. While it is possible that a
similar analysis could be provided for the emergence of mental states from
brain-states, such a treatment would be, at this stage of our understanding
of just what brain-states may or may not have to do with mental states,
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cavalier and unwarranted. Thus, the subsequent discussion of the concept
of emergence as it seems to occur in the structure of scientific modelling
should be explicitly distanced from ‘emergence’ as the term crops up in
discussion about the mind–body problem.
4.1 Emergence
The aspect of emergence which many find most fascinating, that a property
seems to ‘emerge’ when considering systems of different ‘levels’, is one of
the defining characteristics of emergence. Jaegwon Kim has discussed some
metaphysical considerations about what he calls the ‘layered model’: the
supposition that the world is divided into a hierarchy of levels, ‘from the
bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organ-
isms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups
of such creatures’.37 But Kim does not explicitly (or implicitly) limit the
distinction between higher and lower levels to the kind of distinction be-
tween cellular organisms and social creatures. Even this example alone
raises several questions: If social groups of creatures are of a higher level
than cellular organisms, how does this bear on what other kinds of things
may be classed into higher and lower levels? How can we establish how we
would sort other entities into higher and lower levels? Is talk of higher and
lower levels simply another way of expressing a greater or lesser degree of
something?
We can form a starting concept of emergence by understanding the
so-called ‘central doctrines of emergentism’:38
1. Emergence of complex higher-level entities
2. Emergence of higher-level properties
37Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations’, Philosophical
Explorations 5:1 (2002), pp. 2–20.
38Robert Batterman, The Devil in the Details, Oxford: Oxford University Press
(2001), pp. 20–22.
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3. The unpredictability of emergent properties
4. The unexplainability/irreducibility of emergent properties
5. The causal efficacy of the emergents
For our purposes, we can regards these tenets as broad generalizations
of emergent phenomena, while emergence itself may usefully be construed
as a ‘family resemblance’ concept.39 The tenets of emergentism help us
recognize emergent properties and put constraints on what properties might
be considered emergent, and so help to solidify our concept of ‘emergence’;
but they are not set in stone, and Batterman does argue for a different
interpretation of the fifth tenet.
The first tenet of emergentism is the idea that when lower-level enti-
ties come together in new structural configurations, systems with a higher
level of complexity emerge. We can interpret this in several ways. One
interpretation is that this is a way of distinguishing between higher and
lower levels: systems that are structurally more complex are ‘higher’, while
systems that are more complex are ‘lower’. But if this is all there is to emer-
gence, then it seems fairly obvious. A system that is formed by entities that
come together in new structural configurations is necessarily structurally
more complex on the whole than a system that is formed by entities that,
while similar to those in the other system, do not come together in new
structural configurations – assuming, of course, that a scenario can be con-
structed for which the only important difference in two systems is that one
is structurally more complex than the other (due to its having new struc-
tural configurations). Alternatively, the first tenet may be interpreted as
saying that the coming together of lower-level entities in new structural
configurations is simple how complex higher-level entities come about, and
saying that something is of a higher or lower level is not simply another
39David Chalmers, ‘Varieties of Emergence’, http://consc.net/papers/granada.html,
accessed on 18 Nov 2010.
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way of talking about structural complexity. The question thus arises, for
any given case or conception of emergence, what a higher level or lower
level consists in.
The notion of supervenience is useful here: if some property A super-
venes on some other property B, then property A may be taken to be of
a higher level, while property B may be taken to be of a lower level. Su-
pervenience cannot be taken to be a necessary and sufficient condition for
distinguishing between a higher and a lower level, as it is an open question
whether emergent states necessarily supervene on physical states.40
The second tenet is that the properties of, and relations between, lower-
level entities give rise to the properties of higher-level entities. Again, there
is a reading of this that seems fairly innocuous: In considering two discrete
particles, it is clear that the property of containing two particles is not
possessed by either of these particles, but is possessed by a combination of
the two. In this case let us identify the combined system of two particles,
which has more structural complexity than the two individual particles, as
the higher-level entity, and the two discrete particles individually as lower-
level entities; then we can read the property of possessing two particles as
arising from a property of each discrete one-particle system, namely, that
of possessing one particle. The former arises from the latter because the
two one-particle systems are added together.
A distinction needs to be drawn between properties that are merely
resultant and properties that are emergent. A resultant property of a
higher-level entity is one that can be predicted from the properties of the
constituent lower-level entities. We can predict that the system formed by
putting together two systems that contain one particle each will have the
property of containing two particles – it is simply the result of combining
40Timothy O’Connor, ‘Causality, Mind and Free Will’, Philosophical Perspectives 14,
pp. 105–117. O’Connor argues that emergent (mental) states may not supervene on
physical states in dynamic situations, when time-dependent causality is taken into con-
sideration.
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two single-particle systems. Thus the property of possessing two particles
does not emerge from the properties of the two constituent systems; it
merely results from them.
This crucial difference between resultant properties and emergent prop-
erties is encapsulated in the third and fourth tenets, namely, the unpre-
dictability of emergent properties and the irreducibility of emergent prop-
erties. The third tenet tells us that while resultant properties can be pre-
dicted from lower-level information, emergent properties cannot. This en-
ables us to draw a distinction between properties that are emergent and
properties that are merely resultant. A property is only emergent if it can-
not be predicted from information, however exhaustive, of their ‘basal con-
ditions’, the properties of the lower-level entities that make up the higher-
level entities in question. It is insufficient for a property to be emergent
that we simply fail to predict it.
According to the fourth tenet, emergent properties cannot be explained
in terms of their basal conditions, and in the case of the two-particle system,
we can explain the fact that it possesses the property of having two particles
by the fact that each of its constituent systems contains one particle. It is
also insufficient for a higher-level property to be emergent that we simply
fail to explain it in terms of lower-level properties.
The fifth tenet, according to Kim, is that emergent properties are
causally efficacious in a way that the basal constituents are not. Emer-
gent properties have novel causal powers that cannot be reduced to the
causal powers of the basal constituents. Batterman thinks that the fifth
tenet should be re-interpreted as
5. The explanatory role of the emergents: Emergent prop-
erties figure in novel explanatory stories. These stories
involve novel asymptotic theories irreducible to the funda-
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mental theories of the phenomena.41
This is an important difference, but setting aside in-principle reasons
for favouring the ‘causal role’ version or the ‘explanatorily novel’ version
of the fifth tenet, I do not think that to make a case for either version is a
primary concern here. I will not attempt to show that one interpretation
or the other is more appropriate in general for all cases of emergence –
as previously mentioned, the scope of apparent cases of emergence is very
broad, and an exhaustive treatment would be difficult. However, the case
that I am going to consider will lend itself more naturally to Batterman’s
revised interpretation of the fifth tenet – in fact, the account that I give, in
the way that I give it, is incompatible with Kim’s fifth tenet. The reason I
do not take this to be a serious blow against the ‘causal role’ interpretation
of the fifth tenet is that it may just happen to be the case that some
emergent properties play a causal role, and some play an explanatory role,
and further work may simply be required to understand what separates the
two cases.
In this section (§4.1), we have discussed the tenets of emergentism,
which express various aspects of those situations in which emergent prop-
erties arise. The first two tenets are a way of expressing the relation of
the whole to its parts, in situations where emergence seems to occur. The
third and fourth tenets are a way of interpreting our failure, in cases of
emergence, to explain from ostensibly higher levels to lower levels, and vice
versa; or at least, of expressing how the emergent properties are novel.
The fifth tenet seems to be an interpretation of the significance of emer-
gent properties apart from their being novel. We have also seen that there
is some interpretative room to the various tenets of emergentism, as is il-
lustrated by the differing ‘causal role’ and ‘explanatorily novel’ versions
of the fifth tenet. In §4.2, I consider an account of temperature as an
41Robert Batterman, The Devil in the Details, Oxford University Press (2001), p.
127.
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emergent property, with reference to the tenets of emergentism and the
one-dimensional heat equation.
4.2 Temperature as an emergent property
In this section (§4.2), I will show that temperature satisfies some version
of the tenets of emergentism, and thus qualifies as an emergent property.
Concerning talk about emergentism and ‘levels’ in the world, we need
to express these concepts in terms that fit with our structure of scientific
modelling. But of course we cannot simply define, in an ad hoc prescriptive
manner, ‘lower levels’ as one model and ‘higher levels’ as another model.
We generally do not think of models as levels, and if we wish to do so then
it should be in accordance with an at least prima facie plausible principle. I
will examine the possible ways in which we might associate a certain model
with higher or lower levels.
I used the one-dimensional heat equation repeatedly to build up a struc-
ture of scientific modelling, and I will once again make use of it, this time
to show how the structure of scientific modelling may bear on such a topic
as emergence. Less needs to be said now about the place of the one-
dimensional heat equation in scientific modelling and how I think it should
be interpreted, as much of that has already been mentioned.
While examining the role of experiments in supporting different models,
we looked at the matching model, the relevant properties model, and the
equation model for the case of the one-dimensional heat equation. During
this discussion, we observed that the property of temperature, which the
one-dimensional heat equation assigns to every point along an iron bar,
does not really exist at every point along the bar in the matching model.
That is, if we consider the most accurate picture we have of the situation, it
does not look like there is any actual property of ‘temperature’ at any one
location along the bar. But temperature is important in our understand-
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ing of the one-dimensional heat equation. As ‘standard’ physical accounts
would have it, temperature either explains why a flow of thermal energy
through heat occurs, or causes a flow of energy through heat; furthermore,
talk about temperature seems intuitive because we are able to relate to it
in experiential terms. We know what a high temperature, relative to us,
feels like; and we know what a low temperature, relative to us, feels like; it
seems intuitive that there is indeed such a physical property as tempera-
ture. Because of this, anyone who claims that temperature is not a causally
efficacious physical property has to account for what temperature is, if not
a causal property.
Whether or not temperature is a causal property possessed by systems,
we certainly use the term in such a way that ‘temperature’ plays the role
of a causal physical property in the context of the one-dimensional heat
equation, and it is often regarded as an example of an emergent property.
I have argued earlier that temperature-at-a-point is not a robust property
according to the best picture we have of the physical situations that sci-
entists use the one-dimensional heat equation to describe, in the way that
position is a robust physical property. Nonetheless, temperature may be
considered an emergent property. I show this with reference to the tenets
of emergentism, and give an account of what temperature is, as opposed to
it being a real property. And I will do this with reference to the structure
of scientific modelling that we built up earlier.
While I maintain, explicitly, that a general conception of emergence
is not my goal, my characterization of emergence still rules out relatively
strong conceptions of emergence. Because I characterize temperature as
a property that is both emergent and not causally efficacious, it would
seem to follow that there exists an emergent property that is not a causal
property, and therefore that not all emergent properties are causal. This
comes into conflict with, for example, a conception of emergence according
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to which emergent properties must be more than just ‘epistemic artefacts’
of some sort (arising, for example, out of a quirk in some otherwise mostly-
sound formalism), but are genuine higher-level properties that emerge out
of some relation that obtains between lower-level entities. Note, however,
that this does not bear as strongly on what conceptions of emergence are
admissible as it might seem to at first glance. After all, even if temperature
is a particular case of a non-causal emergent property, there could also exist
causally efficacious emergent properties. The conflict is with conceptions
of emergence on which all emergent properties must be causally efficacious.
It is not always clear, in any case of emergence, that a given entity
is of a higher level and that whatever constitutes it is of a lower level.
For example, in the case of sodium chloride being constituted by some
configuration of sodium and chlorine, it is not obvious whether one should
consider sodium chloride to be of a higher level than sodium and chlorine.
Are sodium and chlorine, in turn, of a higher level than protons, electrons,
neutrons; and are protons, electrons, and neutrons of a higher level than
quarks? There is no doubt that these things may be presented in such a
way that some of them belong to a higher level and others belong to a lower
level. But this does not establish that these things are indeed respectively
of higher and lower levels.
The first two tenets of emergentism focus largely on the relation between
the whole and the parts: higher-level entities and properties emerge out
of a coming together, in some complicated manner, of lower-level entities
and properties. So if any of the things just mentioned are of a higher or
lower level than any of the others, it is in part because they bear a part–
whole relation to each other. The possibility of separating an ostensibly
higher-level entity into ostensibly lower-level parts is a basic requirement
for an emergent property to come about in some way. By ‘come about’
here, I mean only that a property becomes identifiable, and can therefore
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be regarded by some agent as emergent, rather than that a causally novel
property genuinely arises in some prima facie brute or inscrutable way from
an arrangement of objects. This leaves open that possibility, but does not
require it. I give an account that does not involve a causal property coming
into existence just to be metaphysically conservative.
As it will become clear in the subsequent discussion, it is not trivial
to establish that temperature is an emergent property. If temperature is
to be considered an emergent property, then it must afford at least the
possibility of coming about in this way, and it does. To establish a picture
of temperature as an emergent property, we must see what could play the
role of the higher-level and lower-level entities. Let us take the case of the
one-dimensional heat equation once more, since the situation is already
familiar to us. The emergent property must be possessed by a higher-level
entity, so the higher-level entity in this case must be the iron bar; and the
iron bar must in turn be composed of lower-level entities in a new structural
configuration, so the lower-level entities must be the particles that make
up the iron bar. There are no other objects that could come together in a
new structural configuration and, in doing so, form the iron bar.
While there are alternatives to this starting picture of how the iron bar
is made up of simpler parts, I find it unlikely that any of them will be any
more plausible than the picture I just presented. Let me briefly mention
two alternatives: that the iron bar is in fact made up of ‘smaller iron bars’;
and that we are entirely mistaken about the atomic-level constituents of
the iron bar.
The first alternative is to consider pieces of the iron bar as coming
together to form a new structural configuration, and in doing so make up
the iron bar; so let us consider two halves of the iron bar coming together
to make up the entire iron bar. But in this case temperature does not
emerge from the coming together of the two halves – each half of the iron
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bar already has a temperature, and in fact as far as the one-dimensional
heat equation is concerned, each half of the iron bar is itself an iron bar,
just shorter; the problem of how ‘temperature’ arises is simply relocated to
the pieces of the iron bar rather than being tackled for the case of the iron
bar itself. So insofar as we want to establish a view of temperature as an
emergent property, a property that arises out of lower-level entities coming
together in a new configuration, we cannot take halves of the iron bar to
be these lower-level constituents.
The second alternative is to suppose that perhaps we are mistaken about
what entities come together to make up the iron bar. Perhaps, instead of
protons and electrons, we have objects on the same size scale as these ele-
mentary particles, or even smaller. In this case temperature could very well
still be an emergent property, just as much as it is as emergent property
in a standard narrative involving the elementary particles with which we
are familiar. For the sake of argument, though, if we are truly mistaken
about what fundamental particles there are, then temperature might well
not be an emergent property – perhaps, once the misconceptions about
fundamental particles are cleared up, we might see that in fact tempera-
ture is nothing novel, but a straightforward result of the particles coming
together.
The problem with this alternative is that even though we do not have
perfect knowledge about fundamental particles, we are nonetheless proba-
bly on the right track with them. The Standard Model of particle physics,
which tells us what particles exist in the world and what their properties
are, is known to have its deficiencies, yet these shortcomings pale in com-
parison to what the Standard Model has helped us to achieve in predicting
and finding patterns in particle interactions. So the burden is on anyone
who wants to take this second alternative seriously, that is, to come up
with a catalogue of particles that are better at producing explanations of
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particle interactions and other small-scale phenomena than the Standard
Model already is.
Having briefly considered and given reasons to be wary of these two
alternatives, I would like to move forward with this picture of temperature:
the particles – protons, neutrons, and electrons – are lower-level entities.
The iron bar as a whole is a higher-level entity, and it is formed when the
lower-level entities come together into that very structural configuration.
Temperature is the emergent property that only comes about when we have
something on the same ‘level’ as the iron bar. Thus we have a picture that
satisfies the first two tenets of emergentism.
If temperature is an emergent property, then it must, according to the
third and fourth tenets of emergentism, be novel in the sense that it can
neither be predicted from nor reducible in terms of the basal constituents of
the iron bar, that is, the iron atoms, protons, and electrons. Is there a way
of reasoning from the motions of the atoms to temperature, and vice versa?
The received view in physics is that temperature is a thermodynamic entity;
the properties associated with the motion of the particles are statistical
mechanical; and a link may be found between the motions of the particles
by considering a ‘thermodynamic limit’, which is the limiting case for which
there is an infinite number of particles in the system. The reason that this
move does not cause any practical problems for scientists is to be found
in the fact that at the scales at which we are interested in temperature
as a property, the particles are so small that we can in practice treat the
material as being continuous. By taking the thermodynamic limit, and by
applying idealization and approximation, physicists are able to transform
the equations that govern large numbers of particles in motion into the
expressions that are found in thermodynamics.
The consequence of this move is significant for a consideration of tem-
perature as an emergent property, for if all talk about temperature turns
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out to be reducible to talk about entities that the underlying theory of
statistical mechanics governs, then temperature cannot be considered an
emergent property, merely one that is ‘resultant’ from statistical mechanics.
But the reduction from thermodynamics to statistical mechanics fails. It
is not that the formal mathematics does not ‘work’, but that the resulting
theory fails descriptively, for the reason that the limit of an infinite number
of particles is unrealizable.
Mathematically, thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are said to
converge in the limit of N → ∞, or 1/N → 0, where N is the number
of particles in the system. These two equations are equivalent from the
point of view of mathematics, as one is just the reciprocal of the other.
We can read them in two ways, neither of which can obtain in the real
world. The first reading is that the number of particles goes to infinity;
combined with a realistic picture of the properties of particles that we know
of, which includes the fact the particles have a finite (if small) size, this
means that the system for which we are considering the thermodynamic
properties must also be infinite in size. The second reading is that, given
that we know that the system is not infinite in size, the size of the particles
is zero – the objects to which we assign ‘temperature’ are, on this reading,
physical singularities. Both of these readings give an unpalatable result.
It is therefore no wonder that Batterman writes this regarding the deep
difference between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics:
The problem here is absolutely fundamental. Thermodynamics
is a continuum theory—fluids are continuous blobs from the
perspective of the upper level classical theory. The fact that
they are made up of large numbers of interacting molecules is
not considered.42
So temperature, being not reducible to, and equivalently not predictable
42Ibid., p. 124
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from, the underlying theory, satisfies the third and fourth tenets of emer-
gentism. As for the fifth tenet, we are left with a choice between the causal
interpretation of emergent properties and the explanatory interpretation
of emergent properties. The causal interpretation of emergent properties
holds that emergent properties possess novel causal powers not possessed
by the lower-level system, while the explanatory interpretation of emergent
properties holds that emergent properties feature in novel explanatory sto-
ries.
I favour the explanatory interpretation in this case, for it seems to me
that there is no property of ‘temperature’ that causes transfers of ‘internal
energy’ through ‘heat’; the causation happens only at the microscopic level.
The causality of particles colliding with one another is as robust as that
of a billiard ball hitting another. But what causes a transfer of energy
– a difference in temperature? (Of course, if one accepts the property of
temperature as really existing at every point along the iron bar, it is not
difficult to then accept that temperature causes a flow of heat. I do not
aim to show that temperature differences cannot be construed as causes;
rather, I shall show that temperature does have a novel explanatory role not
possessed by the base theory. How causation occurs in cases of emergence
is simply not the concern here; my aim is to integrate the temperature
example with the structure of modelling that we built up earlier, and in
order to do so I need to establish an explanatory role for temperature.)
The thermodynamical picture of heat flow in our familiar example of
the one-dimensional heat equation involves a quantity, temperature, being
present at every point along an iron bar. The temperature variation along
the bar and the rate of heat flow are related by the one-dimensional heat
equation, and this is one way of understanding how the transfer of heat
occurs. The statistical mechanical picture of heat flow involves particles of
iron moving at various speeds and colliding with one another; the trans-
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fer of energy due to the collisions, and the rate of collisions, can account
for the transfer of energy along a collection of iron particles in a certain
structural configuration. We have seen that it is necessary to distance the
thermodynamical picture from the statistical mechanical picture – even
though the mathematics of reducing one to the other ‘works’, it does not
follow that one theory is reducible to the other. And there is nothing in
the thermodynamical picture that requires a view of the iron bar as being
made up of particles. On the contrary – the thermodynamical picture, we
have seen, cannot be reduced to the statistical mechanical one. Once we
recognize this, it becomes easier to see that temperature indeed features
in novel explanatory stories. Whatever the narrative given by statistical
mechanics, the explanatory narrative given by thermodynamics has to be
different, because one theory requires a continuum, while the other requires
large numbers of discrete objects.
In this section (§4.2), I have considered the picture of temperature as
an emergent property, and rejected alternatives to it. Temperature is an
emergent property, with macroscopic objects as higher-level entities and
discrete atoms and molecules as lower-level entities. But I have yet to give
an account of how higher levels and lower levels may be incorporated into
the structure of scientific modelling. I will discuss this this in §4.3.
4.3 The origin of emergent properties
In this section, I will examine the higher and lower levels come about
in the case of temperature as an emergent property. In discussions of
emergence, higher levels can reasonably be expected to have a higher degree
of structural complexity than lower levels do, but it is simply not true that
higher or lower levels consist in higher and lower degrees of complexity. (If
it were the case that structural complexity is identifiable with higher levels,
then talk of emergence would itself be reducible to talk about complexity.)
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Combining two systems of one particle each simply results in a system of
two particles; no novel causal or explanatory property emerges from the
union of the two one-particle systems. I will focus specifically on how the
apparent emergence of ‘temperature’ draws the distinction between a higher
and lower level, and so exclude here properties that arise ‘trivially’, such
as the property of having two particles; and properties that merely reflect
the difficulty of mathematics of the system, such as the unavailability of
analytic solutions to the equations that come along with a many-particle
system.
The two-particle system is structurally more complex than each one-
particle system, and we can always add more particles. Adding a particle
to an existing system, while increasing its complexity quantitatively, does
not result in any novel property. By extension, a system of n particles has
the order of n! times more configurations than a system of one particle,
and yet it remains on the same ‘level’ as a one-particle system.43
But I have taken temperature as possessed by an iron bar (a large
number of iron molecules) to be an emergent property, and therefore novel
in some sense. It seems that this thought presents itself: if we start with
a single particle of iron, and add one iron particle at a time, we eventually
end up with an iron bar. How is it that the addition of a single particle
per se is not taken to result in an emergent property, while it looks like an
emergent property arises after the process is repeated a sufficient number
of times?
While this problem may look as if it hides a Sorites paradox, I believe
that it is actually best thought of as the following trilemma:
1. A system of n particles remains on the same ‘level’ as a one-particle
system.
43Although a two-particle system has more instances of position-values than a one-
particle system does, the additional complexity is numerical and not qualitatively new.
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2. The iron bar is a system of n iron molecules (n is large but finite).
3. The iron bar is of a higher level than the iron molecules.
These three statements are clearly incompatible, but which one(s) shall
we give up? Here is where I think our previous discussion on scientific
modelling can illuminate the matter. We have seen how idealization and
abstraction involve deliberate falsifications in order to achieve a greater
ease of understanding or representing a situation. I think that we in fact
introduce a deliberate falsification in order to move between the second
and third statements. When speaking about the ‘iron bar’ in the second
statement, we refer to a collection of molecules, and an explanation of
the processes going on would involve a statistical mechanical story. When
speaking about the ‘iron bar’ in the third statement, we have subtly shifted
to a thermodynamical view of the situation: why is the iron bar of a higher
level? Because it has assigned temperatures, and temperature is an emer-
gent property, hence the iron bar must be of a higher level than the iron
molecules. But the picture of the iron bar that is in the background of the
second statement differs from that as in the third statement: the former is
statistical mechanical, while the latter is thermodynamical.
The deliberate falsification is not in taking a statistical mechanical con-
cept and painting it in thermodynamical hues; rather, it is in letting n go
to infinity. An iron bar for which the one-dimensional heat equation is em-
ployed very likely contains an extremely large number of molecules, more
than we could possibly count – but definitely not infinite. The falsification,
when moving from the statistical mechanical view to the thermodynami-
cal view, is in taking a very large, yet necessarily finite, number and just
letting it ‘be’ infinity. This abstraction has practical merit in this case: it
allows us to use temperature in novel explanatory stories, and simplifies
our talk about many phenomena. Imagine if, instead of talking about the
‘hot’ weather, we instead had to talk about the motion of molecules in the
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atmophere, whose motions were complex and difficult to capture but not
random – hardly pleasant, and I think it clear that to use a full statistical
description instead of a temperature description, every time we need to
give such a description, is beyond us. It might not be beyond hypothetical
beings who can easily produce and use descriptions that do not incorporate
any abstractions, but this is in view of their ability to observe the world
accurately and perform complicated mathematics. For such beings, the
relevant properties model would be much closer to the matching model, in
that their ability to produce and use accurate descriptions of the world is
far superior to ours.
Consider how the case of a heat-conducting iron bar might appear to
beings of (for the sake of argument) arbitrarily high intelligence. For a
being with access to all the initial conditions of an iron bar, assuming such
a being is able to deal with the full complexity of a all the particle–particle
interactions in an iron bar, there would be no need for a ‘thermodynamic
limit’ to create simpler descriptions of a large number of particles; such
a being would not have to employ idealization or abstraction to produce
the thermodynamic property of ‘temperature’ from the statistical mechan-
ical interactions of all the particles in the iron bar. In other words, a
being of arbitrarily high intelligence would be able to understand how en-
ergy is transferred along the iron bar without reference to the concept of
‘temperature’; the entire process would be describable in purely statistical
mechanical terms, by taking into account all the particle–particle collisions
and movements over time. For us, exactly how the transfer of energy oc-
curs along the iron bar has to be described in terms of thermodynamics,
by taking the temperature gradient to be at least correlated with a trans-
fer of energy; for beings of arbitrarily high intelligence, such a description
is unnecessary, because a description in terms of just the movements and
collisions of the particles can be achieved. But it would be strange to think
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that such beings would be unable to employ a temperature-description if
they so wished to – they could surely employ arbitrary levels of precision
in their descriptions of physical situations, if they so wished.
How might the transfer of energy along the iron bar appear to be ex-
plained to such beings? Certainly not by temperature! An arbitrarily
intelligent being would be able to talk about the transfer of energy ‘as if’
there were some aggregate quantity called ‘temperature’ that provides an
explanation for why a transfer of energy occurs along the bar. Yet it seems
unlikely that talk about temperature would be how such beings would
choose to provide an explanation in the case of heat transfer along the iron
bar. Such beings would locate the fundamental explanation of the effect of
heat transfer as being, perhaps, the motion and collisions of the particles
of the iron bar – and of course their concept of ‘collisions’ would incorpo-
rate the concept of interacting electromagnetic and subatomic forces at the
relevant size scale.
How an arbitrarily intelligent being would view the case of the heat-
conducting iron bar therefore stands in firm contrast to how we seem to
view it. We shift from the ‘lower-level’ statistical mechanical picture of
the situation to the ‘higher-level’ thermodynamical picture of the same sit-
uation, while an arbitrarily intelligent being takes the thermodynamical
picture to be merely a quaint caricature of what is the most fundamental
possible explanatory account of the physical situation – one that results
only when the odd devices (odd, that is, to it) of idealization and abstrac-
tion are applied. It appears that the difference between the explanation
that we would give and the explanation that an arbitrarily intelligent being
would tell about the heat-conducting iron bar arises due to a key element:
whether we apply idealization, abstraction, and approximation to the most
fundamental picture of the physical situation. This provides a clue as to
what we are really talking about when we discuss higher and lower ‘levels’,
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why certain properties might come to be regarded as ‘emergent’, and how
the structure of scientific modelling bears on these issues.
What do ‘levels’ consist in? Talk of dividing the world into ‘levels’
can be misleading: it can give the impression that the world is divided
into certain given levels, and that things then fit into these predetermined
levels. But while any acknowledgement of ‘emergence’ leaves room for a
higher level that the emergent property emerges into, out of some lower
level, the higher-ness and lower-ness of these levels is merely relative, and
one that is suggested by the presence of emergence or something like it,
rather than being imposed by the nature of the world itself. It would be a
curiously strong notion of emergentism that takes the world to be divided
brutely into levels that then act like containers that various properties then
happen to fall into, although it would be interesting to see how different
apparent cases of emergence might then fit together, and how transitivity
of emergence might hold across multiple levels.
But it makes sense to talk about a ‘higher’ level and a ‘lower’ level
when considering any single emergent property. In the case of the match-
ing model and the equation model for the heat-conducting iron bar, we can
identify the higher level with the equation model and relevant properties
model, and the lower level with the matching model, because of our the-
oretical background knowledge regarding the properties contained within
each model. According to the hierarchy of scientific modelling that we have
constructed, the matching model is certainly ‘more fundamental’ than the
relevant properties model; in the example that we have been considering,
of the heat-conducting iron bar, the matching model more closely reflects
our most accurate picture of what the bar is really made of and what goes
on in the bar, while the apparently novel property of temperature is arrived
at using various mathematical or conceptual sleights-of-hand, such as the
aforementioned ‘thermodynamic limit’.
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I offer the following way of incorporating emergence into the structure
of scientific modelling. For a consideration of a given case of apparent
emergence, we divide the world into two levels: a ‘higher’ level and a ‘lower’
level. The notion that one level is ‘higher’ and that another is ‘lower’ –
relative to each other – is necessitated by the very consideration of the
apparent emergence itself, because to understand an account of how some
apparently emergent property can even come to be regarded as emergent,
one has to understand, in some way, how certain related entities might be
considered lower-level, and certain others be considered higher-level.
One way in which this account of emergence might be given is the fol-
lowing. This might not apply to all cases of emergence, but it applies in
the case of the heat-conducting iron bar, and a similar account may well
apply to other cases of apparent emergence as well. Given some situa-
tion in which we have a notion of which entities are ostensibly ‘higher’
and which are ostensibly ‘lower’, the higher-level entities seem exceedingly
structurally complicated when considered in terms of the lower level en-
tities, and so we employ some combination of idealization, abstraction,
and approximation to move from a description of the physical situation in
terms of the ostensibly lower-level entities, to a description in terms of the
higher-level entities. The use of idealization, abstraction, and approxima-
tion involves deliberate falsification of some part of the system. In some
cases of apparent emergence, the deliberate falsification might involve the
inadvertent introduction of the notion of some higher-level property that
would not be introduced by brute execution of whatever rules govern the
lower-level system. If producing a higher-level description of a physical
situation involves deliberate falsification and the inadvertent introduction
of the notion of a higher-level property, then such a higher-level property
could thereafter be regarded as an emergent property, as it cannot, strictly
speaking, be inferred from the properties and interactions of the lower-level
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entities that stand closer to the physical situation than the higher-level
description does.
In the case of a heat-conducting iron bar, then, the one-dimensional
heat equation is a higher-level description of the physical situation than a
statistical mechanical picture that involves the positions and motions of the
particles that make up the iron bar. Since temperature is a property that
is derived by taking the thermodynamic limit, which is strictly speaking
unrealizable, temperature is also not strictly speaking inferrable from the
properties of the atoms and molecules that make up the iron bar, or from
their positions and momenta, without taking the thermodynamic limit.44
A comparison of the lower-level picture with the higher-level description
therefore yields temperature as an emergent property, which is consistent
with the discussion in §4.2, in which temperature appears to be an emergent
property when we compare it with the tenets of emergentism (§4.1).
The account that I have just given of how emergent properties emerge
shows, therefore, that it is abstraction, idealization, and approximation
that result in the apparent emergence of certain properties. Since these
moves that involve deliberate falsification only occur between the match-
ing model and the relevant properties model, we can locate emergence
within the structure of scientific modelling as well. Because emergence
is not itself a step of reasoning that scientists make in building models,
but arises as scientists model, it is not strictly speaking a model-building
tool. Nonetheless, it is good to know where an emergent property might
enter the models that scientists work with. This also makes it possible to
pinpoint precisely which descriptions of a given physical situation under
which it makes sense to talk about emergent properties: for example, it
44Sorin Bangu, ‘Understanding thermodynamic singularities: phase transitions, data,
and phenomena’, Philosophy of Science 76 (2009), pp. 488–505. A similar problem arises
on consideration of phase transitions in finite physical systems, as phase transitions are
only derivable from the machinery of statistical mechanics if the thermodynamic limit,
which takes the system to be infinite, is taken. Bangu does not attempt to solve this
conundrum, but to highlight the significance of phase transitions to scientific practice.
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really does not make sense to speak of temperature while working within
the statistical mechanical picture of a limited number of particles. To do so
would mean conflating lower-level entities and properties with higher-level
emergent properties that would result only if some step (specifically, the
thermodynamic limit) involving deliberate falsification were taken.
This account of emergence of temperature is incompatible with Kim’s
version of the tenets of emergentism, particularly the fifth tenet, because
novel causal powers cannot arise simply by introducing deliberate falsifica-
tion in the process of scientific modelling. However, even if it turns out that
I am mistaken that the emergence of temperature is epistemic, that is, that
temperature really has novel causal properties over and above what can be
inferred from the causal properties of the basal constituents – the particles
that make up the iron bar – we can still locate apparent emergence as a
feature that comes about between what is believed to be a matching model
for a physical situation, and the relevant properties model.
Suppose the particles that make up the iron bar could come together in
a way that generates a new property, temperature, that in fact has novel
causal properties. This sort of situation could obtain in a possible world, or
perhaps an impossible world, in which a the thermodynamic limit could be
realized in a finite amount of space – the space that the iron bar occupies.
Then temperature would be a property that actually obtains. There are
two ways of interpreting this. The first is to say that to suppose that
the thermodynamic limit could be realized in a physical situation is itself
a deliberate falsification, in which case the rest of the analysis proceeds
just as before, in which emergence comes about due to the introduction of
deliberate falsification. The second interpretation is to compare what we
currently take to be the matching model of the physical situation, which
necessarily contains all the physical properties of the constituents of the
physical situation, and see how it is that temperature has obtained. If the
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thermodynamic limit is realized in some world, and the introduction of the
thermodynamic limit into the statistical mechanical picture of the physical
situation is not a deliberate falsification, but is rather a reflection of the
physical situation, then the fact that the thermodynamic limit is realized
must be reflected in the matching model as well. Then for temperature
to arise out of the basal constituents of the physical situation is merely a
result of considering all of the interactions between the particles that make
up the iron bar. In such a case, we might look at what we think of as the
matching model for the case of a heat-conducting iron bar in the actual
world, and erroneously think that temperature is an emergent property
with novel causal powers that genuinely arises out of the particles of the
iron bar coming together in some new structural configuration. But such
a situation could only obtain in a world in which the thermodynamic limit
is genuinely realized – not in the actual world. In that world, temperature
is merely the result of the particle–particle interactions, one that can be
correctly inferred from the inclusion of realization of the thermodynamic
limit while working with the models that describe the iron bar and its
particles. So temperature would not turn out to be a genuinely emergent
property, only one that we might think is emergent when we compare what
we think of as the matching model in the actual world with the relevant
properties model in another world. The situations that these models are
models of belong to different worlds, and it is a mistake to conflate them.
Even if we suppose that in the actual world temperature is a property
with seemingly new causal powers that arises out of the particles of the
iron bar coming together in new structural configurations, without any
help from the thermodynamic limit, this would not establish temperature
as an emergent property under the causal powers version of the tenets of
emergentism. This would merely show that we are mistaken about what
we think of as the properties of the particles of the iron bar. Perhaps the
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particles simply have properties that we are unaware of, or perhaps the
statistical mechanical picture is somehow inherently flawed. It would have
to be a part of the properties of the particles that make up the iron bar
that they can come together in some structural configuration to produce
a causally efficacious property, temperature; single particles would have
to have the dispositional property to produce novel properties together
with other particles. Temperature would turn out once again to be merely
apparently emergent, but only so because we have failed to identify the full
set of relevant properties of the particles of the iron bar.
In short, if we are not mistaken about how the notion of a property such
as temperature comes about – in this case, by taking the thermodynamic
limit for an ensemble of particles that obey statistical mechanics – then we
can locate emergent properties as being introduced into a family of models
that describe a physical situation at the same stage where some particular
deliberate falsification is introduced into that family of models.
In §3.4, I identified how the beliefs and intentions of scientists typically
connect to the matching model, relevant properties model, and equation
model, and introduced a sense of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ connectedness depend-
ing on how comprehensively and competently a modeller can treat the
various models. A modeller’s beliefs and intentions connect strongly or
weakly to a model depending on the characteristics of the modeller as well
as those of the model, so although typically the beliefs and intentions of a
scientist are strongly connected to the relevant properties model and only
weakly connected to the matching model, we should not take strong con-
nectedness per se to indicate the presence of emergent properties. A being
of arbitrarily high intelligence could have its intentions and beliefs strongly
connected to the matching model, yet it would still be aware of the notion of
temperature as a result of performing particular mathematical manoeuvres
on the matching model or relevant properties model.
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Having located emergence in the structure of scientific modelling, how
should we now ‘evaluate’ temperature? We know how the emergence of
temperature occurs for the case of the heat-conducting iron bar. With the
realization that temperature is a property that arises out of the introduction
of deliberate falsification may come a sense that perhaps temperature is a
merely derivative property compared to the properties that the physical
situation has in a more robust sense, i.e., properties such as the position
and momentum of a particle of iron. In practice, emergent properties such
as temperature can be placed on an even footing with properties that are
not emergent, such as position, because these are equal with regards to
scientists’ commitments when fixing the content of scientific models. Their
‘theoretical’ difference in status is important, as it reflects the moves that
have been made in the process of modelling, but the pragmatic element of
scientific modelling may not be overlooked.
In conclusion, in this section (§4.3) I have shown that temperature is an
epistemically emergent property under the tenets of emergentism, because
it provides a means for new explanatory stories that cannot be inferred
from the constituents of the physical situations in which temperature arises;
that the emergence of temperature is due to the introduction of deliberate
falsifications in the process of producing new mathematical models from
models of the physical situation; and that despite their origins in deliberate
falsifications, emergent properties nonetheless play as important a role in
modelling a physical situation as any other relevant property.
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